Category Archives: Intension

Re: Peirce List • John Sowa What you say goes to the heart of a problem I saw in Natural Propositions, whether it was Peirce’s account or Stjernfelt’s analysis I did not have time to decide as the schedule of … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List • Jeffrey Brian Downard JBD quoting CSP: I restricted myself to terms, because at the time this chapter was first written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of breadth and depth was equally applicable … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List • John Sowa I gave Frederik Stjernfelt’s Natural Propositions a careful reading back when the Peirce List took it up.  The following archive links will take you to the topic thread and initial post. Peirce List • Frederik Stjernfelt … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List • John Sowa JFS: A more fundamental term is proposition, which is informally defined as the “meaning” of a sentence.  That meaning is usually analyzed as comprehension (also known as intension) and extension. The easier-on-the-eyes blog copy of my … Continue reading →

A puzzle in Peirce I have puzzled over for as long as I can remember involves the relationship between his theory of signs, marking the characters of icons, indices, and symbols, and his theory of inquiry, bearing the three inferences … Continue reading →

Note.  This is a placeholder, to be developed later. Figure 2 shows the implication ordering of logical terms in the form of a lattice diagram. Figure 2. Disjunctive Term u, Taken as Subject Reference Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of … Continue reading →

Let’s stay with Peirce’s example of abductive inference a little longer and try to clear up the more troublesome confusions tending to arise. Figure 1 shows the implication ordering of logical terms in the form of a lattice diagram. Figure … Continue reading →

Many things still puzzle me about Peirce’s account at this point.  I indicated a few of them by means of question marks at several places in the last two Figures.  There is nothing for it but returning to the text … Continue reading →

Peirce identifies inference with a process he describes as symbolization.  Let us consider what that might imply. I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that the puzzle of the validity of scientific inference lies merely in … Continue reading →

Let’s examine Peirce’s second example of a disjunctive term — neat, swine, sheep, deer — within the style of lattice framework we used before. Hence if we find out that neat are herbivorous, swine are herbivorous, sheep are herbivorous, and … Continue reading →