Pragmatic Traction • 3

Re: Deborah G. MayoRevisiting Popper’s Demarcation of Science

I think Peirce would say that any struggle to pass from the irritation of doubt toward the settlement of belief is a form of inquiry — it’s just that some forms work better than others over the long haul.  Instead of a demarcation Peirce describes a spectrum of methods, graded according to their measure of success in achieving the aim of inquiry.

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