Tag Archives: Hypothesis

Peirce identifies inference with a process he describes as symbolization.  Let us consider what that might imply. I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that the puzzle of the validity of scientific inference lies merely in … Continue reading →

Let’s examine Peirce’s second example of a disjunctive term — neat, swine, sheep, deer — within the style of lattice framework we used before. Hence if we find out that neat are herbivorous, swine are herbivorous, sheep are herbivorous, and … Continue reading →

At this point in his inventory of scientific reasoning, Peirce is relating the nature of inference, information, and inquiry to the character of the signs mediating the process in question, a process he is presently describing as symbolization. In the interest … Continue reading →

Re: Ontolog Forum • Azamat Abdoullaev As I suggested in an earlier discussion, the difference that makes a difference in Peirce’s contribution to our understanding of inference and reference is “due to his concurrent development of the logic of relative … Continue reading →

Selection 1 opens with Peirce proposing, “The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous comprehension”, and it closes with his offering the following promise: I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that the … Continue reading →

Peirce now turns to his example of a conjunctive term, which he uses to show the connection between iconic reference and abductive inference. A similar line of thought may be gone through in reference to hypothesis.  In this case we must … Continue reading →

Re: Ontolog Forum • Bruce Schuman When I was first learning information theory, one of my favorite tag lines was: Redundancy is the Essence of Information It’s a bit tongue-in-cheek but none-the-less apt. Although I had happened on hints of … Continue reading →

Selection 3 showed how it was possible to combine symbols in such a way as to end up with species of representation outside the class of genuine symbols and introduced the concepts of conjunctive terms and disjunctive terms to describe … Continue reading →

Selection 3 opens with Peirce remarking a critical property of genuine symbols — the class of symbols is not closed under combinations.  In particular, there are logical conjunctions of symbols and logical disjunctions of symbols which are not themselves genuine … Continue reading →

Over the course of Selection 1 Peirce introduces the ideas he needs to answer stubborn questions about the validity of scientific inference.  Briefly put, the validity of scientific inference depends on the ability of symbols to express superfluous comprehension, the … Continue reading →