Peirce’s 1880 “Algebra Of Logic” Chapter 3 • Selection 1

Chapter 3. The Logic of Relatives

§1. Individual and Simple Terms

214.   Just as we had to begin the study of Logical Addition and Multiplication by considering \infty and 0, terms which might have been introduced under the Algebra of the Copula, being defined in terms of the copula only, without the use of + or \times, but which had not been there introduced, because they had no application there, so we have to begin the study of relatives by considering the doctrine of individuals and simples,— a doctrine which makes use only of the conceptions of non-relative logic, but which is wholly without use in that part of the subject, while it is the very foundation of the conception of a relative, and the basis of the method of working with the algebra of relatives.

215.   The germ of the correct theory of individuals and simples is to be found in Kant’s Critic of the Pure Reason, “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic,” where he lays it down as a regulative principle, that, if

\begin{array}{lll}  a \,-\!\!\!< b & ~ & b \,\overline{-\!\!\!<}\, a,  \end{array}

then it is always possible to find a term x, that

\begin{array}{lll}  a \,-\!\!\!< x & ~ & x \,-\!\!\!< b  \\[8pt]  x \,\overline{-\!\!\!<}\, a & ~ & b \,\overline{-\!\!\!<}\, x.  \end{array}

Kant’s distinction of regulative and constitutive principles is unsound, but this law of continuity, as he calls it, must be accepted as a fact.  The proof of it, which I have given elsewhere, depends on the continuity of space, time, and the intensities of the qualities which enter into the definition of any term.  If, for instance, we say that Europe, Asia, Africa, and North America are continents, but not all the continents, there remains over only South America.  But we may distinguish between South America as it now exists and South America in former geological times;  we may, therefore, take x as including Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, and South America as it exists now, and every x is a continent, but not every continent is x.

References

  • Peirce, C.S. (1880), “On the Algebra of Logic”, American Journal of Mathematics 3, 15–57.  Collected Papers (CP 3.154–251), Chronological Edition (CE 4, 163–209).
  • Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1–6, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), vols. 7–8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935, 1958.  Volume 3 : Exact Logic, 1933.
  • Peirce, C.S., Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1981–.  Volume 4 (1879–1884), 1986.

Resources

Posted in Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Relation Theory, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , | 10 Comments

Peirce’s 1880 “Algebra Of Logic” Chapter 3 • Preliminaries

Recurring questions about relations, especially triadic relations and sign relations, prompt a return to Peirce’s core papers on the logic of relative terms and the mathematics of relations in general.  I began a study of his Peirce’s 1870 “Logic of Relatives” in another series of posts and here take up the chapter on relatives in his 1880 “Algebra of Logic”.

Here is the bibliographic information for the selections that follow:

References

  • Peirce, C.S. (1880), “On the Algebra of Logic”, American Journal of Mathematics 3, 15–57.  Collected Papers (CP 3.154–251), Chronological Edition (CE 4, 163–209).
  • Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1–6, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), vols. 7–8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935, 1958.  Volume 3 : Exact Logic, 1933.
  • Peirce, C.S., Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1981–.  Volume 4 (1879–1884), 1986.

Resources

Posted in Algebra of Logic, Boolean Algebra, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Dyadic Relations, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Relation Theory, Relational Algebra, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Theory of Limits, Triadic Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 9 Comments

Animated Logical Graphs • 5

Re: Peirce List DiscussionHP

A computational problem is defined as a set of problem instances with specified properties.  An algorithm solves a problem if it computes the correct answer to every problem instance in that set.

The use of a problem instance as an expository example is to represent its problem class and to provide some idea of how the algorithm works.  A single problem instance can always be addressed by special pleading but the test of an algorithm is whether it handles the whole set of problem instances.

The program I wrote uses an extended topological variant of Peirce’s Alpha Graphs as its main data structure for representing propositions and it uses a general purpose algorithm that finds the complete set of satisfying logical interpretations for any proposition given on input.  This is tantamount to using propositional calculus as a very simple form of declarative programming language.

References

Posted in Abstraction, Amphecks, Analogy, Animata, Automated Research Tools, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Deduction, Diagrammatic Reasoning, Duality, Form, Graph Theory, Iconicity, Laws of Form, Leibniz, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Model Theory, Peirce, Peirce's Law, Praeclarum Theorema, Pragmatism, Proof Theory, Propositional Calculus, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Theorem Proving, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 12 Comments

Animated Logical Graphs • 4

Re: Peirce ListHelmut Raulien

It’s fair to say most of my university coursework leaned to the theoretical side but I did cobble together a respectable enough background in computing, statistics, and industrial-organizational styles of systems and simulation that most of the work I actually got paid for, aside from teaching, would involve getting down and dirty with real world empirical data, most of it from a wide variety of bio‑sciences, health sciences, and social sciences.  Those experiences kept practical applications to real world scientific inquiry in the forefront of my mind all through the time I developed my series of learning and reasoning programs.

As far as concrete examples go, I have a few.  The more complex ones tend to come from this or that highly specialized research study, and it’s been my experience over the years that applications like that tend to bore everyone to tears but the very specialists who love that precise sort of data.

So exposition is forced to begin with simple examples, very often falling into the class of “toy worlds” problems that AI researchers of old were wont to bandy about.

You may find a series of examples like that, proceeding from the very simplest to the moderately complex, in the User Guide I wrote up for my Theme One Program toward the end of the 1980s.

Applications of my program to Constraint Satisfaction Problems (CSPs) are briefly detailed in the following project report from the mid 1990s.

Posted in Abstraction, Amphecks, Analogy, Animata, Automated Research Tools, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Deduction, Diagrammatic Reasoning, Duality, Form, Graph Theory, Iconicity, Laws of Form, Leibniz, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Model Theory, Peirce, Peirce's Law, Praeclarum Theorema, Pragmatism, Proof Theory, Propositional Calculus, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Theorem Proving, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 12 Comments

Animated Logical Graphs • 3

Re: Peirce ListHelmut Raulien

I have a little more leisure now to start climbing back into the saddle, so let me see where we left off …

Try looking into the article I linked before:

Or my first couple of blog posts on Logical Graphs:

There are literally decades of thought and work that went into those, and if they do not engage the reader in the excitement of possible future developments then I would sorely appreciate any feedback on where and why they fail to do so.

George Spencer Brown is one of the few writers I’ve run across in the time since my first encounter with Peirce’s logical graphs who truly grasped the full depth of Peirce’s insight into logic, a vision that pierced the veil of logical interpretations, entitative and existential, to the deep formal unity between them.  That is one of the reasons I’ve made an effort to treat the two interpretations in parallel as far as I was able.  It is an extremely enticing research question to me whether that symmetry is necessarily broken as we pass from propositional to quantificational logic, or whether there is some way it may be or need be maintained.

But that is a question for the future …

Resource

Posted in Abstraction, Amphecks, Analogy, Animata, Automated Research Tools, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Deduction, Differential Logic, Duality, Form, Graph Theory, Iconicity, Laws of Form, Leibniz, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Minimal Negation Operators, Model Theory, Peirce's Law, Praeclarum Theorema, Proof Theory, Propositional Calculus, Propositional Logic, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Theorem Proving, Topology, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 12 Comments

Pragmatism About Theoretical Entities • 1

By theoretical entities I mean things like classes, properties, qualities, sets, situations, or states of affairs, in general, the putative denotations of theoretical concepts, formulas, sentences, terms, or treatises, in brief, the ostensible objects of signs.

A conventional statement of Ockham’s Razor is —

  • Entities shall not be multiplied beyond necessity.

That is still good advice, as practical maxims go, but a pragmatist will read that as practical necessity or utility, qualifying the things that we need to posit in order to think at all, without getting lost in endless circumlocutions of perfectly good notions.

Nominalistic revolts are well-intentioned when they naturally arise, seeking to clear away the clutter of ostentatious entities ostensibly denoted by signs that do not denote.

But that is no different in its basic intention than what Peirce sought to do, clarifying metaphysics though the application of the Pragmatic Maxim.

Taking the long view, then, pragmatism can be seen as a moderate continuation of Ockham’s revolt, substituting a principled revolution for what tends to descend to a reign of terror.

Posted in Abstraction, C.S. Peirce, Essentialism, Hypostatic Abstraction, Logic, Mathematics, Metaphysics, Method, Nominalism, Ockham, Ockham's Razor, Peirce, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Realism, Semiotics, Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Animated Logical Graphs • 2

Re: Peirce ListJim Willgoose

It’s almost 50 years now since I first encountered the volumes of Peirce’s Collected Papers in the math library at Michigan State, and shortly afterwards a friend called my attention to the entry for Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form in the Whole Earth Catalog and I sent off for it right away.  I would spend the next decade just beginning to figure out what either one of them was talking about in the matter of logical graphs and I would spend another decade after that developing a program, first in Lisp and then in Pascal, that turned graph‑theoretic data structures formed on their ideas to good purpose as the basis of its reasoning engine.

I thought it might contribute to a number of long‑running and ongoing discussions if I could articulate what I think I learned from that experience.

So I’ll try to keep focused on that.

Resources

cc: Academia.eduCyberneticsLaws of FormMathstodon
cc: Research GateStructural ModelingSystems ScienceSyscoi

Posted in Abstraction, Amphecks, Analogy, Animata, Automated Research Tools, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Deduction, Differential Logic, Duality, Form, Graph Theory, Iconicity, Laws of Form, Leibniz, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Minimal Negation Operators, Model Theory, Peirce's Law, Praeclarum Theorema, Proof Theory, Propositional Calculus, Propositional Logic, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Theorem Proving, Topology, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 12 Comments

Animated Logical Graphs • 1

For Your Musement …

Here are some animations I made up to illustrate several different styles of proof in an extended topological variant of Peirce’s Alpha Graphs for propositional logic.

  • Proof Animations
    • Double Negation
    • Double Negation

    • Peirce’s Law
    • Peirce's Law

    • Praeclarum Theorema
    • Praeclarum Theorema

    • Two‑Thirds Majority Function
    • Two‑Thirds Majority Function

A full discussion of logical graphs can be found in the following article.

Resources

cc: Academia.eduCyberneticsLaws of FormMathstodon
cc: Research GateStructural ModelingSystems ScienceSyscoi

Posted in Abstraction, Amphecks, Analogy, Animata, Automated Research Tools, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Deduction, Differential Logic, Duality, Form, Graph Theory, Iconicity, Laws of Form, Leibniz, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Minimal Negation Operators, Model Theory, Peirce's Law, Praeclarum Theorema, Proof Theory, Propositional Calculus, Propositional Logic, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Theorem Proving, Topology, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 12 Comments

Looking Back On 2014

The WordPress.com stats helper monkeys prepared a 2014 annual report for this blog.

Here's an excerpt:

The concert hall at the Sydney Opera House holds 2,700 people. This blog was viewed about 25,000 times in 2014. If it were a concert at Sydney Opera House, it would take about 9 sold-out performances for that many people to see it.

Click here to see the complete report.

Posted in Annual Report, Year In Review | Tagged , | Leave a comment

☝ What Ariadne Said To Theseus ☟

☞ ❝You have to understand, the Minotaur is not clueless —
       it just has a different goal than getting out of the maze.❞ ☜

Posted in Mantra, Maxim, Maze, Myth | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment