Peirce’s 1903 Lowell Lectures • Comment 7

Cf: Laws Of Form DiscussionJA
Re: Peirce List DiscussionJA

I’ll go ahead and copy out the first part of the article on Logical Implication, as I find I am still pleased with all I was able to say in such a short space.

Logical Implication

The concept of logical implication encompasses a specific logical function, a specific logical relation, and the various symbols that are used to denote this function and this relation.  In order to define the specific function, relation, and symbols in question it is first necessary to establish a few ideas about the connections among them.

Close approximations to the concept of logical implication are expressed in ordinary language by means of linguistic forms like the following:

\begin{array}{l}  p ~\text{implies}~ q.  \\[6pt]  \text{if}~ p ~\text{then}~ q.  \end{array}

Here {}^{\backprime\backprime} p {}^{\prime\prime} and {}^{\backprime\backprime} q {}^{\prime\prime} are propositional variables that stand for any propositions in a given language.  In a statement of the form {}^{\backprime\backprime} \text{if}~ p ~\text{then}~ q {}^{\prime\prime}, the first term, p, is called the antecedent and the second term, q, is called the consequent, while the statement as a whole is called either the conditional or the consequence.  Assuming that the conditional statement is true, then the truth of the antecedent is a sufficient condition for the truth of the consequent, while the truth of the consequent is a necessary condition for the truth of the antecedent.

Note.  Many writers draw a technical distinction between the form {}^{\backprime\backprime} p ~\text{implies}~ q {}^{\prime\prime} and the form {}^{\backprime\backprime} \text{if}~ p ~\text{then}~ q {}^{\prime\prime}.  In this usage, writing {}^{\backprime\backprime} p ~\text{implies}~ q {}^{\prime\prime} asserts the existence of a certain relation between the logical value of p and the logical value of q, whereas writing {}^{\backprime\backprime} \text{if}~ p ~\text{then}~ q {}^{\prime\prime} merely forms a compound statement whose logical value is a function of the logical values of p and q.  This will be discussed in detail below.

Reference

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Peirce’s 1903 Lowell Lectures • Comment 6

Cf: Laws Of Form DiscussionJA

Continuing discussion of the conditional form, as expressed in Peirce’s logical graphs under the existential interpretation, incited me to cite one of my own essays on the subject.

Re: Peirce List Discussions • (1)(2)(3)

The concept of logical implication or material conditional — its names are legion — is ever a source of logical bedevilment.  It has proved no different in the discussion of Peirce’s logical graphs however much potential they bear for resolving the confusion if given the chance.

Here’s a link to an article on Logical Implication I originally wrote for Wikipedia where I attempted to synthesize the more coherent perspectives on the subject I had learned from various communities of usage over the years.

The last time I looked at the Wikipedia relic it had devolved into the usual run-of-the-mill obscurities of nominalism so let’s not go there.  The Wikiversity edition still looks okay.

I’ve been meaning for years now to add the graphical representations — maybe these recent discussions will nudge me to do that …

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The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 19

Re: Peirce ListJohn Sowa

Peirce uses the word “formal” in a sense that gives it normative force.  It is this sense in which he defines logic as formal semiotic.

But taking “formal” in a normative sense weighs against John Sowa’s suggestion of a “sharp distinction between ‘formal logic’, which is part of mathematics, from logic as a normative science”.

I don’t think it means that “formal logic” is “formal formal semiotic”, much less a part of mathematics.  It simply means that logic is inherently formal (= normative) and adding the adjective “formal” is redundant.

Relevant Texts

Selections from C.S. Peirce, “Carnegie Application” (1902)

No. 12. On the Definition of Logic

Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic.  A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.  Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C.  It is from this definition, together with a definition of “formal”, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic.  I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally recognized.  (NEM 4, 20–21).

Selection from C.S. Peirce, “Ground, Object, and Interpretant” (c. 1897)

Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another name for semiotic (σημειωτική), the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs.  By describing the doctrine as “quasi-necessary”, or formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what must be the characters of all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience.  As to that process of abstraction, it is itself a sort of observation.  (CP 2.227).

Previous Discussions

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Peirce’s 1903 Lowell Lectures • Comment 5

The World of Ā

Cf: Laws Of Form DiscussionJA

The relationship between classical and non-classical logic is a topic that comes up from time to time in these discussions.  Inquiry into it tends to take a different tack when guided by Peirce’s placement of logic as a normative science within the more general study of triadic sign relations.  Here’s a brief comment I posted on the Peirce List with links to previous comments on the Foundations Of Math List when the subject came up there.

Re: Peirce List DiscussionGF

On the relationship between the classical laws of logic and their easement, relaxation, stay, or violation in the qualities of generality and vagueness, see the quotes and remarks I posted to the Foundations Of Mathematics List.

Resources

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Peirce’s 1903 Lowell Lectures • Comment 4

Cf: Laws Of Form DiscussionJA

A couple of comments in response to questions about the relationship between Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form and the broader scope of Peirce’s Logical Graphs.

Re: Peirce List DiscussionHR

George Spencer Brown mentions Charles S. Peirce and also Christine Ladd-Franklin in the chapter notes, appendices, and references of his Laws of Form.  Just scanning very quickly, I find references on pages 90, 111, and 136 in my copy.

Almost in spite of its extremely elegant style, Laws of Form did succeed in reviving a visual way of looking at logic that Peirce had pioneered but that few other logicians took up with any success in the intervening years.  It drew out and clarified a number of insights into the mathematical forms and methods of logic that Peirce had the depth of vision to peer into but did not always have the opportunity to develop as far as possible.

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Peirce’s 1903 Lowell Lectures • Comment 3

Cf: Laws Of Form DiscussionJA

Peirce’s use of the “scroll” as a graphical syntax for implication continued to raise many questions at this point in the Peirce List reading.  I think a lot of what bothers people has more to do with general misunderstandings about material implication than anything peculiar to Peirce’s graphs.  I suggested a way of reading the “scroll” \texttt{(} a \texttt{(} b \texttt{))} that makes it crystal clear to me, namely, “not a without b”, and then I added the following comment.

Re: Peirce List DiscussionHR

Peirce’s approach in these lectures appeals to the line of thinking that takes implications and the corresponding subject-predicate form as basic, but that is not the only possible basis for a system of logical syntax and not the only basis that Peirce himself took up in his many syntactic experiments.  In relating logical signs to logical objects it normally proves best to remain flexible and to consider the object of logic that is common to all its avatars.

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Peirce’s 1903 Lowell Lectures • Comment 2

How Logic Got Its Blots

Cf: Laws Of Form DiscussionJA

Taking positive implication as a basic construct, as Peirce does in the lectures at hand, one has to find a way to rationalize the introduction of negative concepts, in the first instance, logical negation and a logical constant for falsity.  Questions about this naturally arose in the Peirce List reading, prompting me to make the following comment on Peirce’s just-so-story, especially as it bears on the link between primary arithmetic and primary algebra.

Re: Peirce List DiscussionGF

Peirce’s introduction of the “blot” at this point as a logical constant for absurdity or falsity is one of the places where he touches on the arithmetic of logic underlying the algebra of logic, a development that began with his taking up the empty sheet of assertion, a tabula rasa or uncarved block, as a logical constant for truth.

The radical insight involved in this move would later be emphasized by George Spencer Brown when he revived Peirce’s graphical approach to logic in the late 1960s.

More to follow, as I find the opportunity …

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Pragmatic Traction • 7

Re: Peirce ListJohn Sowa

It’s good to remember that observation, perception itself, has an abductive character in Peirce’s analysis and induction for him is more a final testing than initial conception stage.  Yes, it’s wheels upon wheels but some steps are logically more primitive in the recursion.

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Peirce’s 1903 Lowell Lectures • Comment 1

Cf: Laws Of Form DiscussionJA

A question arose concerning one of Peirce’s ways of explaining logical negation.

Re: Peirce List DiscussionGF

I commented as follows.

One way of saying “not x” or “x is false” is to say “x implies α” where “α” is taken to mean “any proposition whatever”.  This is the hoary old rule of ex falso quodlibet, more lately going under the name explosion principle.  It is related to the definition of an inconsistent logical system as one in which every formula is a theorem, and thus in which no line of distinction can be drawn between true and false.

One place where Peirce makes use of this style of negation is in his comments on a logical formula we now call Peirce’s Law.

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Peirce’s 1903 Lowell Lectures • Preliminaries

Cf: Laws Of Form DiscussionJA
Re: Peirce List DiscussionGF

In September the Peirce List began a reading of Peirce’s 1903 Lowell Lectures (“Some Topics of Logic Bearing on Questions Now Vexed”).  I’ve had opportunities for only a few desultory comments from time to time but as it turned out most of those thoughts had to do with the algebraic, graph-theoretic, and logical ideas exhibited by Peirce’s systems of logical graphs and Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form.

At any rate, I thought there might be something in those remarks worth recycling to the Laws of Form discussion group and other interested parties.

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