Category Archives: Aristotle

Precursors Of Category Theory • 2

Posted on December 30, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Thanks to art, instead of seeing one world only, our own, we see that world multiply itself and we have at our disposal as many worlds as there are original artists … ☙ Marcel Proust Precursors Of Category Theory When … Continue reading →

Posted in Abstraction, Ackermann, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Carnap, Category Theory, Hilbert, Kant, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Relation Theory, Saunders Mac Lane, Sign Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments

Precursors Of Category Theory • 1

Posted on December 20, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

A few years back I began a sketch on the Precursors of Category Theory, aiming to trace the continuities of the category concept from Aristotle, thorough Kant and Peirce, Hilbert and Ackermann, to contemporary mathematical use.  Perhaps a few will … Continue reading →

Posted in Abstraction, Ackermann, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Carnap, Category Theory, Hilbert, Kant, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Relation Theory, Saunders Mac Lane, Sign Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 10 Comments

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability : 3

Posted on December 12, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • Phyllis Chiasson A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here. A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Enthymeme, Icon Index Symbol, Logic, Peirce, Peirce List, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability : 2

Posted on December 11, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • Phyllis Chiasson I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Logic, Peirce, Peirce List, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability : 1

Posted on December 11, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense: A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Logic, Peirce, Peirce List, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Objects, Models, Theories : 4

Posted on November 27, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

I need to stay with this problem a while … What are objects, models, theories, and how do they relate to one another? In contemplating this problem I always find it helpful to ruminate on the diagram shown above — … Continue reading →

Posted in Adaptive Systems, Analogy, Aristotle, Artificial Intelligence, Biological Systems, C.S. Peirce, Computational Complexity, Evolution, Gödel, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Learning Theory, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematical Models, Mental Models, Model Theory, Natural Intelligence, Paradigms, Peirce, Pragmata, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Objects, Models, Theories : 3

Posted on November 21, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • Tom Gollier Here my task is to build bridges between several different classical and contemporary uses of the word model, so I don’t have the luxury of complete control over the words in play but … Continue reading →

Posted in Adaptive Systems, Analogy, Aristotle, Artificial Intelligence, Biological Systems, C.S. Peirce, Computational Complexity, Evolution, Gödel, Information, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Learning Theory, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematical Models, Mental Models, Model Theory, Natural Intelligence, Peirce, Pragmata, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Objects, Models, Theories : 2

Posted on November 20, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: K.W. Regan • The Graph Of Math Re: Artem Kaznatcheev • Three Types Of Mathematical Models What — if anything — is the common sense that connects the different senses of the word model, as it has been used … Continue reading →

Posted in Adaptive Systems, Analogy, Aristotle, Artificial Intelligence, Biological Systems, C.S. Peirce, Computational Complexity, Evolution, Gödel, Information, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Learning Theory, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematical Models, Mental Models, Model Theory, Natural Intelligence, Peirce, Pragmata, Semiotics | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

“What we’ve got here is (a) failure to communicate” • 6

Posted on November 15, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Excerpt from Warren S. McCulloch, “What Is a Number, that a Man May Know It, and a Man, that He May Know a Number?” (1960) Please remember that we are not now concerned with the physics and chemistry, the anatomy … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Amphecks, Aristotle, Automata, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Combinatorics, Deduction, Duns Scotus, Induction, Leibniz, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Neural Models, Ockham, Peirce, Propositional Logic, Psychons, Relation Theory, Sources, Triadic Relations, Warren S. McCulloch, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

What Is A Theorem That A Human May Prove It?

Posted on June 19, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Gil Kalai • Why Is Mathematics Possible? • Tim Gowers’ Take On The Matter Comment 1 To the extent that mathematics has to do with reasoning about possible existence, or inference from pure hypothesis, a line of thinking going … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Conjecture, Deduction, Epistemology, Hypothesis, Induction, Inquiry, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Peirce, Proof Theory, Retroduction, Theorem Proving, Warren S. McCulloch | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments