Category Archives: Aristotle

Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 8

Posted on September 17, 2018 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Ontolog Forum • JS The concept of a triadic sign relation, in typical form where is the object domain (think universe of discourse) and and are domains of signs (think channels or languages) being used to talk and think … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Definition, Determination, Extension, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Intention, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Measurement, Observation, Peirce, Perception, Phenomenology, Physics, Pragmatic Semiotic Information, Pragmatism, Probability, Quantum Mechanics, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 7

Posted on September 14, 2018 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Ontolog Forum • JS JS: It appears to me that it is very difficult to fully grasp the fundamental issues associated with pragmatic semiotic information when the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry is the main object … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Definition, Determination, Extension, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Intention, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Measurement, Observation, Peirce, Perception, Phenomenology, Physics, Pragmatic Semiotic Information, Pragmatism, Probability, Quantum Mechanics, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 6

Posted on September 12, 2018 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Ontolog Forum • JS The subject of natural languages and their relation to formal languages, for example, logical calculi, logical graphs, mathematical formalisms, and programming languages, has come up periodically in our discussions and I’ve been struggling to arrive … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Definition, Determination, Extension, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Intention, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Measurement, Observation, Peirce, Perception, Phenomenology, Physics, Pragmatic Semiotic Information, Pragmatism, Probability, Quantum Mechanics, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 5

Posted on September 10, 2018 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Ontolog Forum • AA Of course it’s not that simple.  I called it a cornerstone not a whole building but it gives us a starting point and a first approach to a pragmatic semiotic architecture still being built as we speak. … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Definition, Determination, Extension, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Measurement, Observation, Peirce, Perception, Peter Woit, Phenomenology, Physics, Pragmatic Semiotic Information, Pragmatism, Probability, Quantum Mechanics, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 4

Posted on September 8, 2018 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Is Quantum Mechanics A Probabilistic Theory? • What Is Measurement? Measurement is an extension of perception.  Measurement gives us data about an object system the way perception gives us percepts, which we may consider just a species of data. … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Definition, Determination, Extension, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Measurement, Observation, Peirce, Perception, Peter Woit, Phenomenology, Physics, Pragmatic Semiotic Information, Pragmatism, Probability, Quantum Mechanics, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 12

Posted on March 28, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • JFS • JFS • JAS • GF • JAS • GF I realize that iconolatry — just one of many forms of dyadic reductionism — runs too deep at present for most folks to appreciate this, … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 11

Posted on March 28, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • CG • JA • CG • JA • CG • JA • CG One of the points I’ve been trying to make all along is that a person doesn’t normally need to make a working … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 10

Posted on March 27, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

A paragraph from Kant and associated discussion I added to the Wikipedia article on the Correspondence Theory of Truth in June 2006 is useful at this point, and it serves to set up a corresponding statement from Peirce that we’ll take … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 9

Posted on March 26, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Clark Goble • Jon Awbrey • Clark Goble • Jon Awbrey • Clark Goble To put things more plainly, it’s a routine observation we have no need for moods and tenses in actually doing mathematics, that … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 8

Posted on March 25, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Clark Goble • Jon Awbrey • Clark Goble • Jon Awbrey With respect to the issues surrounding “modal realism” — what stance Peirce took and when he took it — let me refer to a figure … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments