Tag Archives: Likeness

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here. A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people … Continue reading

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort … Continue reading

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Re: Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense — A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for … Continue reading

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Problems In Philosophy • 4

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. Regan • Did Euclid Really Mean ‘Random’? These are the forms of time, which imitates eternity and revolves according to a law of number. Plato • Timaeus • 38 A Benjamin Jowett (trans.) It is … Continue reading

Posted in Aristotle, Computation, Computer Science, Euclid, Genericity, Geometry, Iconicity, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Mathematics, Number Theory, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Plato, Probability, Socrates | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here. A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people … Continue reading

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort … Continue reading

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Re: Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense — A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for … Continue reading

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments