Inquiry Into Inquiry • Flash Back

The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves …

Julius Caesar • 1.2.141–142

Signs have a power to inform, to lead our thoughts and thus our actions in accord with reality, to make reality our friend.  And signs have a power to misinform, to corrupt our thoughts and thus our actions and lead us to despair of all our ends.

Excerpt from Bertrand Russell • “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (1918)

4. Propositions and Facts with More than One Verb: Beliefs, Etc.

4.3. How shall we describe the logical form of a belief?

I want to try to get an account of the way that a belief is made up.  That is not an easy question at all.  You cannot make what I should call a map-in-space of a belief.  You can make a map of an atomic fact but not of a belief, for the simple reason that space-relations always are of the atomic sort or complications of the atomic sort.  I will try to illustrate what I mean.

The point is in connexion with there being two verbs in the judgment and with the fact that both verbs have got to occur as verbs, because if a thing is a verb it cannot occur otherwise than as a verb.

Suppose I take ‘A believes that B loves C’.  ‘Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio’.  There you have a false belief.  You have this odd state of affairs that the verb ‘loves’ occurs in that proposition and seems to occur as relating Desdemona to Cassio whereas in fact it does not do so, but yet it does occur as a verb, it does occur in the sort of way that a verb should do.

I mean that when A believes that B loves C, you have to have a verb in the place where ‘loves’ occurs.  You cannot put a substantive in its place.  Therefore it is clear that the subordinate verb (i.e. the verb other than believing) is functioning as a verb, and seems to be relating two terms, but as a matter of fact does not when a judgment happens to be false.  That is what constitutes the puzzle about the nature of belief.

You will notice that whenever one gets to really close quarters with the theory of error one has the puzzle of how to deal with error without assuming the existence of the non-existent.

I mean that every theory of error sooner or later wrecks itself by assuming the existence of the non-existent.  As when I say ‘Desdemona loves Cassio’, it seems as if you have a non-existent love between Desdemona and Cassio, but that is just as wrong as a non-existent unicorn.  So you have to explain the whole theory of judgment in some other way.

I come now to this question of a map.  Suppose you try such a map as this:

Othello Believes Desdemona Loves Cassio

This question of making a map is not so strange as you might suppose because it is part of the whole theory of symbolism.  It is important to realize where and how a symbolism of that sort would be wrong:  Where and how it is wrong is that in the symbol you have this relationship relating these two things and in the fact it doesn’t really relate them.  You cannot get in space any occurrence which is logically of the same form as belief.

When I say ‘logically of the same form’ I mean that one can be obtained from the other by replacing the constituents of the one by the new terms.

If I say ‘Desdemona loves Cassio’ that is of the same form as ‘A is to the right of B’.  Those are of the same form, and I say that nothing that occurs in space is of the same form as belief.

I have got on here to a new sort of thing, a new beast for our zoo, not another member of our former species but a new species.  The discovery of this fact is due to Mr. Wittgenstein.  (Russell, POLA, 89–91).

Reference

  • Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”, pp. 35–155 in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, edited with an introduction by David Pears, Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1985.  First published 1918.

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Inquiry Into Inquiry • In Medias Res

Re: Daniel Everett

DE:
I am trying to represent two readings of the three juxtaposed sentences in English.  The first reading is that the judge and the jury both know that Malcolm is guilty.  The second is that the judge knows that the jury thinks that Malcolm is guilty.

Daniel Everett • Judge, Jury, Malcolm, Guilty • Graph 1

Daniel Everett • Judge, Jury, Malcolm, Guilty • Graph 2

Do these purported EGs of mine seem correct to you?

Dear Dan,

Apologies for the delay in responding … I won’t have much of use to say about those particular graphs as I’ve long been following a different fork in Peirce’s work about how to get from Alpha to Beta, from propositional to quantificational logic via graphical syntax.

But the examples raise one of the oldest issues I’ve bothered about over the years, going back to the days when I read PQR (Peirce, Quine, Russell) in tandem and many long discussions with my undergrad phil advisor.  That is the question of intentional contexts and “referential opacity”.  The thing is Peirce’s pragmatic standpoint yields a radically distinct analysis of belief, knowledge, and indeed truth from the way things have been handled down the line from logical atomism to logical empiricism to analytic philosophy in general.  As it happens, there was a critical branch point in time when Russell almost got a clue but Wittgenstein bullied him into dropping it, at least so far as I could tell from a scattered sample of texts.

At any rate, I fell down the Wayback Machine rabbit hole looking for things I wrote about all this on the Peirce List and other places around the web at the turn of the millennium …

I’d almost be tempted to start a blog series on this, probably simulcast on the Facebook Peirce Matters page if you’re into discussing it online … I have enough off the cuff to start an anchor post or two, but it might be the middle of August before I could do much more.

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Inquiry Into Inquiry • On Initiative 2

Re: Scott Aaronson(1)(2)(3)

SA:
Personally, I’d give neither of them [Bohr or Einstein] perfect marks, in part because they not only both missed Bell’s Theorem, but failed even to ask the requisite question (namely:  what empirically verifiable tasks can Alice and Bob use entanglement to do, that they couldn’t have done without entanglement?).  But I’d give both of them very high marks for, y’know, still being Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr.

To Ask The Requisite Question

This brings me to the question I wanted to ask about AI sentience, but was afraid to ask.

  • Does GPT-3 ever ask an original question on its own?

Simply asking for clarification of an interlocutor’s prompt is not insignificant but I’m really interested in something more spontaneous and “self‑starting” than that.  Does it ever wake up one morning, as it were, and find itself in a “state of question”, a state of doubt or uncertainty so compelling as to bring it to ask on its own initiative what we might recognize as a novel question?

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Sign Relations • Discussion 14

Re: Cybernetics • Cliff Joslyn (1) (2) (3) (4)

Dear Cliff,

A few examples of sign relations and triadic relations may serve to illustrate the problem of their demarcation.

First, to clear up one point of notation, in writing L \subseteq O \times S \times I, there is no assumption on my part the relational domains O, S, I are necessarily disjoint.  They may intersect or even be identical, as O = S = I.  Of course we rarely need to contemplate limiting cases of that type but I find it useful to keep them in our categorical catalogue.  (Other writers will differ on that score.)  On the other hand, we very often consider cases where S = I, as in the following two examples of sign relations discussed in Sign Relations • Examples.

Sign Relation Twin Tables LA & LB

We have the following data.

\begin{array}{ccl}  O & = & \{ \mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B} \}  \\[6pt]  S & = & \{ ``\mathrm{A}", ``\mathrm{B}", ``\mathrm{i}", ``\mathrm{u}" \}  \\[6pt]  I & = & \{ ``\mathrm{A}", ``\mathrm{B}", ``\mathrm{i}", ``\mathrm{u}" \}  \end{array}

As I mentioned, those examples were deliberately constructed to be as simple as possible but they do exemplify many typical features of sign relations in general.  Until the time my advisor asked me for cases of that order I had always contemplated formal languages with countable numbers of signs and never really thought about finite sign relations at all.

Reference

  • Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.  Online.

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Sign Relations • Discussion 13

Re: Cybernetics • Cliff Joslyn (1) (2) (3)

Dear Cliff,

Backing up a little —

Whether a thing qualifies as a sign is not an ontological question, a matter of what it is in itself, but a pragmatic question, a matter of what role it plays in a particular application.

By extension, whether a triadic relation qualifies as a sign relation is not just a question of its abstract structure but a question of its potential applications, of its fitness for a particular purpose, namely, whether we can imagine it capturing aspects of objective structure immanent in the conduct of logical reasoning.

Because it’s difficult, and not even desirable, to place prior limits on “what we can imagine finding a use for”, there is seldom a good case for trying to reduce pragmatic definitions to ontological definitions.  That’s why I feel bound to leave the boundaries a bit fuzzy.

Just to sum up what I’ve been struggling to say here —

It’s not a bad idea to cast an oversized net at the outset, and the à priori method can take us a way with that, but developing semiotics beyond its first principles and early stages will depend on gathering more significant examples of sign relations and sign transformations approaching the level we actually employ in the practice of communication, computation, inquiry, learning, proof, and reasoning in general.  I think that’s probably the best way to see the real sense and utility of Peirce’s double definition of logic and signs.

Reference

  • Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.  Online.

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Sign Relations • Discussion 12

Re: CyberneticsCliff Joslyn

CJ:
For a given arbitrary triadic relation L \subseteq O \times S \times I (let’s say that O, S, and I are all finite, non‑empty sets), I’m interested to understand what additional axioms you’re saying are necessary and sufficient to make L a sign relation.  I checked Sign Relations • Definition, but it wasn’t obvious, or at least, not formalized.

Dear Cliff,

From a purely speculative point of view, any triadic relation L \subseteq X \times X \times X on any set X might be capable of capturing aspects of objective structure immanent in the conduct of logical reasoning.  At least I can think of no reason to exclude the possibility à priori.

When we turn to the task of developing computational adjuncts to inquiry there is still no harm in keeping arbitrary triadic relations in mind, as entire hosts of them will turn up on the universe side of many universes of discourse we happen to encounter, if nowhere else.

Peirce’s use of the word definition understandably leads us to anticipate a strictly apodictic development, say, along the lines of abstract group theory or axiomatic geometry.  In that light I often look to group theory for hints on how to go about tackling a category of triadic relations such as we find in semiotics.  The comparison makes for a very rough guide but the contrasts are also instructive.

More than that, the history of group theory, springing as it did as yet unnamed from the ground of pressing mathematical problems, from Newton’s use of symmetric functions and Galois’ application of permutation groups to the theory of equations among other sources, tells us what state of development we might reasonably expect from the current still early days of semiotics.

To be continued …

Reference

  • Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.  Online.

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Sign Relations • Discussion 11

Re: CyberneticsCliff Joslyn

CJ:
For a given arbitrary triadic relation L \subseteq O \times S \times I (let’s say that O, S, and I are all finite, non‑empty sets), I’m interested to understand what additional axioms you’re saying are necessary and sufficient to make L a sign relation.  I checked Sign Relations • Definition, but it wasn’t obvious, or at least, not formalized.

Dear Cliff,

Peirce claims a definition of logic as formal semiotic and goes on to define a sign in terms of its relation to its interpretant sign and its object.

For ease of reference, here’s the cited paragraph again.

Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic.  A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.  Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C.  It is from this definition, together with a definition of “formal”, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic.  I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non‑psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally recognized.  (C.S. Peirce, NEM 4, 20–21).

Let me cut to the chase and say what I see in that passage.  Peirce draws our attention to a category of mathematical structures of use in understanding various domains of complex phenomena by capturing aspects of objective structure immanent in those domains.

The domains of complex phenomena of interest to logic in its broadest sense encompass all that appears on the discourse side of any universe of discourse we happen to discuss.  That’s a big enough sky for anyone to live under, but for the moment I am focusing on the ways we transform signs in activities like communication, computation, inquiry, learning, proof, and reasoning in general.  I’m especially focused on the ways we do now and may yet use computation to advance the other pursuits on that list.

To be continued …

Reference

  • Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.  Online.

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Inquiry Into Inquiry • On Initiative 1

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. ReganSorting and Proving

Somewhat incidental to the twin themes of Sorting and Proving in computer science, Dick Lipton and Ken Regan made the following observation about an AI program whose sentience or otherwise is currently a hot topic in the news.

  • GPT‑3 works by playing a game of guess the next word in a phrase.  This is akin to guess the next move in chess and other games, and we will have more to say about it.

And that inspired the following reflection on my part.

  • As a person who struggles on a daily basis to rise to the level of sentience
    I’ve learned it has more to do with beginning than ending this sentence.

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Sign Relations • Semiotic Equivalence Relations 2

A few items of notation are useful in discussing equivalence relations in general and semiotic equivalence relations in particular.

In general, if E is an equivalence relation on a set X then every element x of X belongs to a unique equivalence class under E called the equivalence class of x under E.  Convention provides the square bracket notation for denoting such equivalence classes, in either the form [x]_E or the simpler form [x] when the subscript E is understood.  A statement that the elements x and y are equivalent under E is called an equation or an equivalence and may be expressed in any of the following ways.

\begin{array}{clc}  (x, y) & \in & E  \\[4pt]  x & \in & [y]_E  \\[4pt]  y & \in & [x]_E  \\[4pt]  [x]_E & = & [y]_E  \\[4pt]  x & =_E & y  \end{array}

Thus we have the following definitions.

\begin{array}{ccc}  [x]_E & = & \{ y \in X : (x, y) \in E \}  \\[6pt]  x =_E y & \Leftrightarrow & (x, y) \in E  \end{array}

In the application to sign relations it is useful to extend the square bracket notation in the following ways.  If L is a sign relation whose connotative component L_{SI} is an equivalence relation on S = I, let [s]_L be the equivalence class of s under L_{SI}.  In short, [s]_L = [s]_{L_{SI}}.  A statement that the signs x and y belong to the same equivalence class under a semiotic equivalence relation L_{SI} is called a semiotic equation (SEQ) and may be written in either of the following forms.

\begin{array}{clc}  [x]_L & = & [y]_L  \\[6pt]  x & =_L & y  \end{array}

In many situations there is one further adaptation of the square bracket notation for semiotic equivalence classes which can be useful.  Namely, when there is known to exist a particular triple (o, s, i) in a sign relation L, it is permissible to let [o]_L be defined as [s]_L.  This lets the notation for semiotic equivalence classes harmonize more smoothly with the frequent use of similar devices for the denotations of signs and expressions.

Applying the array of equivalence notations to the sign relations for A and B will serve to illustrate their use and utility.

Connotative Components Con(L_A) and Con(L_B)

The semiotic equivalence relation for interpreter \mathrm{A} yields the following semiotic equations.

\begin{matrix}  [ {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{A} {}^{\prime\prime} ]_{L_\mathrm{A}}  & = &  [ {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{i} {}^{\prime\prime} ]_{L_\mathrm{A}}  \\[6pt]  [ {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{B} {}^{\prime\prime} ]_{L_\mathrm{A}}  & = &  [ {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{u} {}^{\prime\prime} ]_{L_\mathrm{A}}  \end{matrix}

or

\begin{matrix}  {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{A} {}^{\prime\prime}  & =_{L_\mathrm{A}} &  {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{i} {}^{\prime\prime}  \\[6pt]  {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{B} {}^{\prime\prime}  & =_{L_\mathrm{A}} &  {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{u} {}^{\prime\prime}  \end{matrix}

In this way it induces the following semiotic partition.

\{ \{ {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{A} {}^{\prime\prime}, {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{i} {}^{\prime\prime} \}, \{ {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{B} {}^{\prime\prime}, {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{u} {}^{\prime\prime} \} \}.

The semiotic equivalence relation for interpreter \mathrm{B} yields the following semiotic equations.

\begin{matrix}  [ {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{A} {}^{\prime\prime} ]_{L_\mathrm{B}}  & = &  [ {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{u} {}^{\prime\prime} ]_{L_\mathrm{B}}  \\[6pt]  [ {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{B} {}^{\prime\prime} ]_{L_\mathrm{B}}  & = &  [ {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{i} {}^{\prime\prime} ]_{L_\mathrm{B}}  \end{matrix}

or

\begin{matrix}  {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{A} {}^{\prime\prime}  & =_{L_\mathrm{B}} &  {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{u} {}^{\prime\prime}  \\[6pt]  {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{B} {}^{\prime\prime}  & =_{L_\mathrm{B}} &  {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{i} {}^{\prime\prime}  \end{matrix}

In this way it induces the following semiotic partition.

\{ \{ {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{A} {}^{\prime\prime}, {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{u} {}^{\prime\prime} \}, \{ {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{B} {}^{\prime\prime}, {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{i} {}^{\prime\prime} \} \}.

Semiotic Partitions for Interpreters A and B

References

  • Peirce, C.S. (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.  Online.
  • Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), pp. 40–52.  ArchiveJournal.  Online (doc) (pdf).

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Sign Relations • Semiotic Equivalence Relations 1

A semiotic equivalence relation (SER) is a special type of equivalence relation arising in the analysis of sign relations.  Generally speaking, any equivalence relation induces a partition of the underlying set of elements, known as the domain or space of the relation, into a family of equivalence classes.  In the case of a SER the equivalence classes are called semiotic equivalence classes (SECs) and the partition is called a semiotic partition (SEP).

The sign relations L_\mathrm{A} and L_\mathrm{B} have many interesting properties over and above those possessed by sign relations in general.  Some of those properties have to do with the relation between signs and their interpretant signs, as reflected in the projections of L_\mathrm{A} and L_\mathrm{B} on the SI‑plane, notated as \mathrm{proj}_{SI} L_\mathrm{A} and \mathrm{proj}_{SI} L_\mathrm{B}, respectively.  The dyadic relations on S \times I induced by those projections are also referred to as the connotative components of the corresponding sign relations, notated as \mathrm{Con}(L_\mathrm{A}) and \mathrm{Con}(L_\mathrm{B}), respectively.  Tables 6a and 6b show the corresponding connotative components.

Connotative Components Con(L_A) and Con(L_B)

A nice property of the sign relations L_\mathrm{A} and L_\mathrm{B} is that their connotative components \mathrm{Con}(L_\mathrm{A}) and \mathrm{Con}(L_\mathrm{B}) form a pair of equivalence relations on their common syntactic domain S = I.  This type of equivalence relation is called a semiotic equivalence relation (SER) because it equates signs having the same meaning to some interpreter.

Each of the semiotic equivalence relations, \mathrm{Con}(L_\mathrm{A}), \mathrm{Con}(L_\mathrm{B}) \subseteq S \times I \cong S \times S partitions the collection of signs into semiotic equivalence classes.  This constitutes a strong form of representation in that the structure of the interpreters’ common object domain \{ \mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B} \} is reflected or reconstructed, part for part, in the structure of each one’s semiotic partition of the syntactic domain \{ {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{A} {}^{\prime\prime}, {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{B} {}^{\prime\prime}, {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{i} {}^{\prime\prime}, {}^{\backprime\backprime} \mathrm{u} {}^{\prime\prime} \}.

It’s important to observe the semiotic partitions for interpreters \mathrm{A} and \mathrm{B} are not identical, indeed, they are orthogonal to each other.  Thus we may regard the form of the partitions as corresponding to an objective structure or invariant reality, but not the literal sets of signs themselves, independent of the individual interpreter’s point of view.

Information about the contrasting patterns of semiotic equivalence corresponding to the interpreters \mathrm{A} and \mathrm{B} is summarized in Tables 7a and 7b.  The form of the Tables serves to explain what is meant by saying the SEPs for \mathrm{A} and \mathrm{B} are orthogonal to each other.

Semiotic Partitions for Interpreters A and B

References

  • Peirce, C.S. (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.  Online.
  • Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), pp. 40–52.  ArchiveJournal.  Online (doc) (pdf).

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