Re: Daniel Everett
- I am trying to represent two readings of the three juxtaposed sentences in English. The first reading is that the judge and the jury both know that Malcolm is guilty. The second is that the judge knows that the jury thinks that Malcolm is guilty.
Do these purported EGs of mine seem correct to you?
Apologies for the delay in responding … I won’t have much of use to say about those particular graphs as I’ve long been following a different fork in Peirce’s work about how to get from Alpha to Beta, from propositional to quantificational logic via graphical syntax.
But the examples raise one of the oldest issues I’ve bothered about over the years, going back to the days when I read PQR (Peirce, Quine, Russell) in tandem and many long discussions with my undergrad phil advisor. That is the question of intentional contexts and “referential opacity”. The thing is Peirce’s pragmatic standpoint yields a radically distinct analysis of belief, knowledge, and indeed truth from the way things have been handled down the line from logical atomism to logical empiricism to analytic philosophy in general. As it happens, there was a critical branch point in time when Russell almost got a clue but Wittgenstein bullied him into dropping it, at least so far as I could tell from a scattered sample of texts.
At any rate, I fell down the Wayback Machine rabbit hole looking for things I wrote about all this on the Peirce List and other places around the web at the turn of the millennium …
I’d almost be tempted to start a blog series on this, probably simulcast on the Facebook Peirce Matters page if you’re into discussing it online … I have enough off the cuff to start an anchor post or two, but it might be the middle of August before I could do much more.