Ouch❢

A child hears it said that the stove is hot.  But it is not, he says; and, indeed, that central body is not touching it, and only what that touches is hot or cold.  But he touches it, and finds the testimony confirmed in a striking way.  Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere.  …

In short, error appears, and it can be explained only by supposing a self which is fallible.

Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the absolute ego of pure apperception.

🙞 C.S. Peirce • “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Man

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Ego, Error, Ignorance, Inquiry, References, Selfhood, Semiotics, Sources | Tagged , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments

i wax impressionistic

would that i could be starting something new ~~~
but there is all of this unfinished business - -
and so many threads spin out from this point - -
the endeavor toward a functional integration
of logic and information within a reasonable
account of inquiry, the obstacles to inquiry
that rise up to block any way forward, as if
in the very moment that we derive a positive
momentum in any direction at all.  and still ~ ~
i look for an organized way to begin and see
nothing at all of that organic kind to start ---
or maybe i mistake the nature of the organon - -

jon awbrey • 01 jan 2002

Posted in Verse | Tagged | Leave a comment

The Big Picture

Scientific knowledge will not save the world if it remains in the brains and blogs and journals of scientists and makes no impression on people in general, policymakers, and the powers that be.

Reflections on recent discussions too numerous to enumerate, but including these:

I plan to talk about many things on this blog: from math to physics to earth science and biology, computer science and the technologies of today and tomorrow — but in general, centered around the theme of what scientists can do to help save a planet in crisis.

— John Baez

Listen! For no more the presage of my soul,
Bride-like, shall peer from its secluding veil;
But as the morning wind blows clear the east,
More bright shall blow the wind of prophecy.

— Words of Cassandra in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon

Posted in Inquiry, The Big Picture | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Knowledge Workers of the World, Unite❢

Comments on Gowers’s Weblog

Post 1. What’s wrong with electronic journals?

Comment 1.1

Having spent a good part of the 1990s writing about what the New Millennium would bring to our intellectual endeavours, it is only fair that I should have spent the last dozen years wondering why the New Millennium is so late in arriving. With all due reflection I think it is time to face the fact that the fault, Dear Gowers, is not in our technology, but in ourselves.

Here is one of my last, best attempts to get at the root of the matter:

Journal Version
Awbrey, S.M., and Awbrey, J.L. (2001), “Conceptual Barriers to Creating Integrative Universities”, Organization : The Interdisciplinary Journal of Organization, Theory, and Society 8(2), Sage Publications, London, UK, 269–284.  AbstractOnline.
Conference Version
Awbrey, S.M., and Awbrey, J.L. (1999), “Organizations of Learning or Learning Organizations : The Challenge of Creating Integrative Universities for the Next Century”, Second International Conference of the Journal ‘Organization’, Re‑Organizing Knowledge, Trans‑Forming Institutions : Knowing, Knowledge, and the University in the 21st Century, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA.  Online.

Comment 1.2

Prestige = Prestidigitation

Comment 1.3

There are indeed Big Picture questions that open up here — the future of knowledge and inquiry, the extent to which their progress will be catalyzed or inhibited by collaborative versus corporate-controlled information technologies, the stance of knowledge workers, vigilant or acquiescent, against the ongoing march of global corporate feudalism — and maybe this is not the place or time to pursue these questions, but in my experience discussion, like love and gold, is where you find it. Being questions of this magnitude, they will of course arise again. The question is — who will settle them, and to whose satisfaction?

Post 2. Abstract thoughts about online review systems

Comment 2.1

What is inquiry? And how can we tell if a potential contribution makes an actual contribution to it? Questions like these often arise, as far as mathematical inquiry goes, in trying to build heuristic problem solvers, theorem-provers, and other sorts of mathematical amanuenses.

Charles S. Peirce, who pursued the ways of inquiry more doggedly than any thinker I have ever read, sifted the methods of “fixing belief” into four main types — Tenacity, Authority, Plausibility (à priori pleasingness), and full-fledged Scientific Inquiry.

I posed the question — “What part do arguments from authority play in mathematical reasoning?” — on MathOverFlow some time ago and received a number of interesting answers.

Comment 2.2

The late Joseph Ransdell (1931–2010), who did more to keep C.S. Peirce’s thought alive on the Web than anyone else I know, had a particular interest in the issues surrounding open peerage and publication. Synchronicity being what it is, the members of the Peirce List have been conducting a slow reading of one of Joe’s papers on the subject, where he examined the work of Paul Ginsparg on open access and Peter Skagestad on intelligence augmentation in the light of Peirce’s theory of signs, a.k.a. semiotic. Here is the paper:

Comment 2.3

Re: Eric Zaslow

In order to have an error-correcting system, or be capable of changing the mission statement in other than a random way, one has to have an independent sense of the objective. In practice, this usually means a number of independent but converging operations that tell you when and how far your system has gone off course.

Comment 2.4

Re: Edward Cree

There is a very instructive post about the difference between measures and targets (means and ends) on Peter Cameron’s Blog —

Goodhart’s law asserts:

When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.

Comment 2.5

Re: Edward Cree

This enters on a wide-ranging subject — one that tears me between rushing in and fearing to tread …

I didn’t get around to finishing this comment, but I think I meant to introduce a few extra readings by way of establishing the scope of this wide-ranging subject.

Readings —

Post 3. Elsevier’s open letter point by point, and some further arguments

Comment 3.1

As I said before, the problem is not Elsevier, but Elsewhere.

Participants in a particular paradigm of publishing or perishing are currently feeling the pinch of a proprietary system that served them in the past, feeling they have become its serfs not its lords. Will these angelic doctors look homeward, to the prisons of prestige and priority they have served to build around themselves? — Ay, there’s the rub.

On jugera …

Post 4. Elsevier Withdraws Support for Research Works Act

Comment 4.1

Re: “This deserves a post to itself, despite my intention to reclaim this blog for its core purpose.”

On the other hand, we could try thinking like mathematicians about the problem before us. What are the elements of the problem, and what does it mean to think like a mathematician, anyway?

Experience tells me that private interests like publishers, and those who increasingly serve private interests on the public’s payroll, will continue to define the problem to their satisfaction and keep trying to enforce solutions that suit those interests, but we may find matter that touches our core purpose by standing back and taking a fresh look at the whole system involved.

A good start has been made —

Since I’m trying to discuss the fundamentals here, let me briefly address the question of whether the notion of the “quality” of a piece of mathematics makes sense. We certainly talk as though it makes sense, but is there something objective that underlies the seemingly subjective judgments that we make the whole time?

— Timothy Gowers • Abstract thoughts about online review systems

But it’s only a start …

Comments on John Baez’s “Azimuth”

Post 5. The Education of a Scientist

Comment 5.1

I think that all of the world’s citizens need to start paying more attention to the push by private interests to private-profitize the entire public sector, including control over education, research, and the social media. The stakes for society and the planet cannot be overestimated.

Comments on Peter Cameron’s Blog

Post 6. Open Access Publishing

Comment 6.1

By nature and training a whole systems thinker, I tend to view the architecture of commerce, the architecture of government, and the architecture of inquiry as participants in a larger system.

When it comes to the desiderata of inquiry, I find myself constantly returning to the guidance of Charles S. Peirce, so elegantly maximized in the following words:

My last best expression of how I saw the problem of sustaining the soul of inquiry within the body of the post*modern millennial university is contained in the following paper:

One out of three is all I can do today …

* Yes, that’s a Kleene star. You do the math.

Comment 6.2

As far as the interaction between the dynamics of commerce and the dynamics of inquiry goes, there may always be a tension between the two value systems, the one that is coming to value short-term monetary profit above all else, and the one that orients itself toward sustainable truth over the long haul.

But I think we are passing a critical point, where the party of gold is now insisting on a right to control the whole, or else crush the party of green out of existence.

Back when this discussion starting hitting the air webs, I collected a few of my impressions on this blog page:

Comment 6.3

Re: Dratman

Peer review as a measure of quality can be replaced — and in these times there is no austerity of forces pushing to replace it with something far worse. Wherever you find a measure of quality that is too one-dimensional and simple-minded to be true, you will find that someone is getting filthy rich selling the custodians of quality a clockwork broom.

Comment 6.4

Re: James Street

We may continue to criticize establishment ways of doing everything, as I, for one, have always done, but my point is that far worse ways are now in the offing, and being pushed by forces that are resolutely alien to the common ideals of our many-splintered communities of inquiry.

Comment 6.5

Re: James Street

Strictly speaking, “peer” means “equal”. When a question cannot be settled among equals, “an umpire”, whose name derives by false division from “a non-peer“, must be called into play. However imperfect a given peer system may be in practice, nothing destroys the community and its ideals so much as umpires who insinuate themselves in the process of inquiry when there is no call for them to do so.

Comment 6.6

Re: James Street

Having said a little about the dynamics of inquiry in its own right and the impact of commerce and inquiry on each other, it was my intention to make at least tangential remarks on the other sides of the tri-umpirate: {Commerce, Government, Inquiry}.

We have quite naturally come to the lambda point of all three, but there very little but chaos reigns, so let me back up and offshore a fraction of the excess tension to a brant on my own blog —

Post 7. Student Questionnaires

Comment 7.1

The difference between the devil and the divinity may lie in the details, but it’s not unusual for the devil to decoy us with detail after detail, when the unexamined premiss is the screen behind which the real deil lies.

Comment 7.2

The tests themselves — good, bad, but mostly ugly — are a diversionary maneuver. The end-run we should be watching is the sneaking shift in the locus of evaluation and therefore control.

A couple of articles pertaining to the Great Education Deformation on the U.S. scene —

Naturally, Neyman blames Pearson.

Comments on Bridging Differences

Post 8. The Pearsonizing of the American Mind

Comment 8.1

The difference between the devil and the divinity may lie in the details, but it’s not unusual for the devil to decoy us with detail after detail, when the unexamined premiss is the screen behind which the real deil lies.

A bit more prosaically —

The tests themselves — good, bad, but mostly ugly — are a diversionary maneuver. The end-run we should be watching is the sneaking shift in the locus of evaluation and therefore control.

Comment 8.2

Yes, it’s all about the Locusts of Control —

Being by nature and training a whole systems thinker, I tend to view the War on Democracy, the War on Education, and the War on Science as just three fronts in a full-scale war on the ability of free societies to chart their own ships of state with information, knowledge, and wisdom about all aspects of the realities that face them.

So I think there is a lot at stake, to say the least.

Posted in Comments Elsewhere, Inquiry, Open Access Research, Social Media, The Big Picture | Tagged , , , , | 4 Comments

Sinecure

Forgive me, Author, for I have signed
A sign that forges your original sign —
How I miss the indelible mark of thine!

Posted in Verse | Tagged | Leave a comment

Forwarding Address for Knol Articles

It looks like the Annotum developers are following the fashion of the day in rolling out their platform first and testing it later. There doesn’t appear to be any way to edit the articles ported over from Knol to Annotum without reducing them to utter hash, so I copied my Knol articles to another blog, archiving them under the Annotum theme until such time as the Annotum developers get the bugs out of their system. In the meantime I will continue working on those and other articles here.

Posted in Redirect | Tagged | Leave a comment

I Am A Rock

I Am A Rock

Posted in Video | Tagged | Leave a comment

Peirce’s Law

A Curious Truth of Classical Logic

Peirce’s law is a propositional calculus formula which states a non‑obvious truth of classical logic and affords a novel way of defining classical propositional calculus.

Introduction

Peirce’s law is commonly expressed in the following form.

((p \Rightarrow q) \Rightarrow p) \Rightarrow p

Peirce’s law holds in classical propositional calculus, but not in intuitionistic propositional calculus.  The precise axiom system one chooses for classical propositional calculus determines whether Peirce’s law is taken as an axiom or proven as a theorem.

History

Here is Peirce’s own statement and proof of the law:

A fifth icon is required for the principle of excluded middle and other propositions connected with it.  One of the simplest formulae of this kind is:

\{ (x \,-\!\!\!< y) \,-\!\!\!< x \} \,-\!\!\!< x.

This is hardly axiomatical.  That it is true appears as follows.  It can only be false by the final consequent x being false while its antecedent (x \,-\!\!\!< y) \,-\!\!\!< x is true.  If this is true, either its consequent, x, is true, when the whole formula would be true, or its antecedent x \,-\!\!\!< y is false.  But in the last case the antecedent of x \,-\!\!\!< y, that is x, must be true.  (Peirce, CP 3.384).

Peirce goes on to point out an immediate application of the law:

From the formula just given, we at once get:

\{ (x \,-\!\!\!< y) \,-\!\!\!< \alpha \} \,-\!\!\!< x,

where the \alpha is used in such a sense that (x \,-\!\!\!< y) \,-\!\!\!< \alpha means that from (x \,-\!\!\!< y) every proposition follows.  With that understanding, the formula states the principle of excluded middle, that from the falsity of the denial of x follows the truth of x.  (Peirce, CP 3.384).

Note.  Peirce uses the sign of illation ``-\!\!\!<" for implication.  In one place he explains ``-\!\!\!<" as a variant of the sign ``\le" for less than or equal to;  in another place he suggests that A \,-\!\!\!< B is an iconic way of representing a state of affairs where A, in every way that it can be, is B.

Graphical Representation

Representing propositions in the language of logical graphs, and operating under the existential interpretation, Peirce’s law is expressed by means of the following formal equivalence or logical equation.

Peirce's Law

Graphical Proof

Using the axiom set given in the articles on logical graphs, Peirce’s law may be proved in the following manner.

Peirce's Law • Proof

The following animation replays the steps of the proof.

Peirce's Law • Proof Animation

Equational Form

A stronger form of Peirce’s law also holds, in which the final implication is observed to be reversible, resulting in the following equivalence.

((p \Rightarrow q) \Rightarrow p) \Leftrightarrow p

The converse implication p \Rightarrow ((p \Rightarrow q) \Rightarrow p) is clear enough on general principles, since p \Rightarrow (r \Rightarrow p) holds for any proposition r.

Representing propositions as logical graphs under the existential interpretation, the strong form of Peirce’s law is expressed by the following equation.

Peirce's Law : Strong Form

Using the axioms and theorems listed in the entries on logical graphs, the equational form of Peirce’s law may be proved in the following manner.

Peirce's Law : Strong Form • Proof

The following animation replays the steps of the proof.

Peirce's Law : Strong Form • Proof Animation

References

  • Peirce, Charles Sanders (1885), “On the Algebra of Logic : A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation”, American Journal of Mathematics 7 (1885), 180–202.  Reprinted (CP 3.359–403), (CE 5, 162–190).
  • Peirce, Charles Sanders (1931–1935, 1958), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1–6, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), vols. 7–8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.  Cited as (CP volume.paragraph).
  • Peirce, Charles Sanders (1981–), Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN.  Cited as (CE volume, page).

Resources

cc: FB | Logical Graphs • Laws of Form • Mathstodon • Academia.edu
cc: Conceptual Graphs • Cybernetics • Structural Modeling • Systems Science

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Equational Inference, Laws of Form, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Peirce's Law, Proof Theory, Propositional Calculus, Propositions As Types Analogy, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 15 Comments

Praeclarum Theorema

Introduction

The praeclarum theorema, or splendid theorem, is a theorem of propositional calculus noted and named by G.W. Leibniz, who stated and proved it in the following manner.

If a is b and d is c, then ad will be bc.
This is a fine theorem, which is proved in this way:
a is b, therefore ad is bd (by what precedes),
d is c, therefore bd is bc (again by what precedes),
ad is bd, and bd is bc, therefore ad is bc.  Q.E.D.

— Leibniz • Logical Papers, p. 41.

Expressed in contemporary logical notation, the theorem may be written as follows.

((a \Rightarrow b) \land (d \Rightarrow c)) \Rightarrow ((a \land d) \Rightarrow (b \land c))

Expressed as a logical graph under the existential interpretation, the theorem takes the shape of the following formal equivalence or propositional equation.

Praeclarum Theorema (Leibniz)

And here’s a neat proof of that nice theorem —

Praeclarum Theorema • Proof

The steps of the proof are replayed in the following animation.

Praeclarum Theorema • Proof Animation

Reference

  • Leibniz, Gottfried W. (1679–1686?), “Addenda to the Specimen of the Universal Calculus”, pp. 40–46 in G.H.R. Parkinson (ed., trans., 1966), Leibniz : Logical Papers, Oxford University Press, London, UK.

Readings

Resources

cc: FB | Logical Graphs • Laws of Form • Mathstodon • Academia.edu
cc: Conceptual Graphs • Cybernetics • Structural Modeling • Systems Science

Posted in Abstraction, Animata, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Deduction, Equational Inference, Form, Graph Theory, Laws of Form, Leibniz, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Model Theory, Painted Cacti, Peirce, Praeclarum Theorema, Proof Theory, Propositional Calculus, Propositional Equation Reasoning Systems, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 17 Comments

Logical Graphs • Formal Development

Logical graphs are next presented as a formal system by going back to the initial elements and developing their consequences in a systematic manner.

Formal Development

Logical Graphs • First Impressions gives an informal introduction to the initial elements of logical graphs and hopefully supplies the reader with an intuitive sense of their motivation and rationale.

The next order of business is to give the precise axioms used to develop the formal system of logical graphs.  The axioms derive from C.S. Peirce’s various systems of graphical syntax via the calculus of indications described in Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form.  The formal proofs to follow will use a variation of Spencer Brown’s annotation scheme to mark each step of the proof according to which axiom is called to license the corresponding step of syntactic transformation, whether it applies to graphs or to strings.

Axioms

The formal system of logical graphs is defined by a foursome of formal equations, called initials when regarded purely formally, in abstraction from potential interpretations, and called axioms when interpreted as logical equivalences.  There are two arithmetic initials and two algebraic initials, as shown below.

Arithmetic Initials

Axiom I₁

Axiom I₂

Algebraic Initials

Axiom J₁

Axiom J₂

Logical Interpretation

One way of assigning logical meaning to the initial equations is known as the entitative interpretation (En).  Under En, the axioms read as follows.

\begin{array}{ccccc}  \mathrm{I_1}  & : & \text{true} ~ \text{or} ~ \text{true}  & = & \text{true}  \\[4pt]  \mathrm{I_2}  & : & \text{not} ~ \text{true}  & = & \text{false}  \\[4pt]  \mathrm{J_1}  & : & a ~ \text{or} ~ \text{not} ~ a  & = & \text{true}  \\[4pt]  \mathrm{J_2}  & : & (a ~ \text{or} ~ b) ~ \text{and} ~ (a ~ \text{or} ~ c)  & = & a ~ \text{or} ~ (b ~ \text{and} ~ c)  \end{array}

Another way of assigning logical meaning to the initial equations is known as the existential interpretation (Ex).  Under Ex, the axioms read as follows.

\begin{array}{ccccc}  \mathrm{I_1}  & : & \text{false} ~ \text{and} ~ \text{false}  & = & \text{false}  \\[4pt]  \mathrm{I_2}  & : & \text{not} ~ \text{false}  & = & \text{true}  \\[4pt]  \mathrm{J_1}  & : & a ~ \text{and} ~ \text{not} ~ a   & = & \text{false}  \\[4pt]  \mathrm{J_2}  & : & (a ~ \text{and} ~ b) ~ \text{or} ~ (a\ \text{and}\ c)  & = & a ~ \text{and} ~ (b ~ \text{or} ~ c)  \end{array}

Equational Inference

All the initials I_1, I_2, J_1, J_2 have the form of equations.  This means the inference steps they license are reversible.  The proof annotation scheme employed below makes use of double bars =\!=\!=\!=\!=\!= to mark this fact, though it will often be left to the reader to decide which of the two possible directions is the one required for applying the indicated axiom.

The actual business of proof is a far more strategic affair than the routine cranking of inference rules might suggest.  Part of the reason for this lies in the circumstance that the customary types of inference rules combine the moving forward of a state of inquiry with the losing of information along the way that doesn’t appear immediately relevant, at least, not as viewed in the local focus and short run of the proof in question.  Over the long haul, this has the pernicious side‑effect that one is forever strategically required to reconstruct much of the information one had strategically thought to forget at earlier stages of proof, where “before the proof started” can be counted as an earlier stage of the proof in view.

This is just one of the reasons it can be very instructive to study equational inference rules of the sort our axioms have just provided.  Although equational forms of reasoning are paramount in mathematics, they are less familiar to the student of the usual logic textbooks, who may find a few surprises here.

Frequently Used Theorems

To familiarize ourselves with equational proofs in logical graphs let’s run though the proofs of a few basic theorems in the primary algebra.

C1.  Double Negation Theorem

The first theorem goes under the names of Consequence 1 (C1), the double negation theorem (DNT), or Reflection.

Double Negation Theorem

The proof that follows is adapted from the one George Spencer Brown gave in his book Laws of Form and credited to two of his students, John Dawes and D.A. Utting.

Double Negation Theorem • Proof

C2.  Generation Theorem

One theorem of frequent use goes under the nickname of the weed and seed theorem (WAST). The proof is just an exercise in mathematical induction, once a suitable basis is laid down, and it will be left as an exercise for the reader. What the WAST says is that a label can be freely distributed or freely erased anywhere in a subtree whose root is labeled with that label. The second in our list of frequently used theorems is in fact the base case of this weed and seed theorem. In LOF it goes by the names of Consequence 2 (C2) or Generation.

Logical Graph Figure 27 (27)

Here is a proof of the Generation Theorem.

Logical Graph Figure 28 (28)

C3.  Dominant Form Theorem

The third of the frequently used theorems of service to this survey is one that Spencer-Brown annotates as Consequence 3 (C3) or Integration. A better mnemonic might be dominance and recession theorem (DART), but perhaps the brevity of dominant form theorem (DFT) is sufficient reminder of its double-edged role in proofs.

Logical Graph Figure 29 (29)

Here is a proof of the Dominant Form Theorem.

Logical Graph Figure 30 (30)

Exemplary Proofs

Using no more than the axioms and theorems recorded so far, it is possible to prove a multitude of much more complex theorems. A couple of all-time favorites are listed below.

Posted in Animata, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Deduction, Equational Inference, Graph Theory, Laws of Form, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Propositional Calculus, Propositional Equation Reasoning Systems, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 42 Comments