Inquiry Into Inquiry

Re: Peirce List • Jerry Rhee

The tools Peirce gave us for articulating complex cases of inquiry processes, as mediated by complex cases of triadic sign relations, are worth sharpening up to the point where we can make a significant difference in our understanding of real‑world phenomena and the problems they present us.

Doing all that requires us to pore over the details of what Peirce — and even Aristotle and even by implication Plato’s Socrates — had to say about the three basic types of inference, all the while sorting out the degree to which their observations, guesses, and deductions fit the bill of the pragmatic maxim well enough to be useful.

Resources

• Peirce’s 1870 Logic Of Relatives
• Survey of Relation Theory
• Logic Syllabus

cc: Peirce List (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Re: Peirce List • Gary Richmond

Time and again Peirce refers to the logic of relatives as the key to understanding the more complex issues in his theory of inquiry and theory of signs.  I find this to be good advice.

The best antidote for confusion about triadic sign relations and the three basic modes of inference can be found in the study of Peirce’s early papers on the logic of relatives and the logic of science.  His first expeditions, for all their rough and exploratory character, perhaps even because of it, give far more concrete examples of relations in general and triadic sign relations in particular, plus a better idea of actual practice in the ways of inquiry, than the often detached abstractions of his later speculations and summations.

From what I’ve seen through many years of watching people struggle with Peirce, it is almost impossible to get what Peirce is talking about in his later work without getting a foothold on the concrete foundation he laid down at the outset of his work.

A close reading of Peirce’s 1870 “Logic of Relatives” would be extremely beneficial in understanding and applying Peirce’s ideas to realistic and significant open problems.  It’s where I began my own acquaintance with Peirce’s work and I posted my notes up through the foothills of the paper on the web several times, the current version at the following site.

• Peirce’s 1870 Logic Of Relatives

cc: Peirce List (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Re: Beyond Experiment • Scott Church

Names are not important of course, except for the purpose of communication.  The important thing is for us to distinguish hypothesis formation from hypothesis evaluation.  Now, there happens to be a long tradition of using the word abduction to distinguish that former, most incipient stage of inquiry and I think it serves communication to preserve that tradition.

Concepts, hypotheses, and theories have to be formed, logically speaking, before they can be evaluated.  In complex inquiries extending over long periods of time, formation, evaluation, and re‑formation will of course proceed in cascades of parallel and series operations, but the analytic distinction between elements and mixtures is still worth its salt.

The role of ab‑, de‑, in‑duction in the cycle of inquiry is discussed a bit further in the following article.

• Inquiry

Resources

• Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy
• Prospects for Inquiry Driven Systems
• Introduction to Inquiry Driven Systems
• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry

cc: Peirce List (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Re: Beyond Experiment • Scott Church

Let me just say again that abduction is not “inference to the best explanation”.  That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce’s idea and it has led to a whole literature of misconception.  Abduction is more like “inference to any explanation” — or perhaps adapting Kant’s phrase, “conceiving a concept that reduces a manifold to a unity”.  The most difficult part of its labor is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, able to serve as a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain.

Resources

• Inquiry
• Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy
• Prospects for Inquiry Driven Systems
• Introduction to Inquiry Driven Systems
• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry

cc: Peirce List (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Re: Peter Woit • Beyond Experiment

I have no horse in this race (cat in this box?) as far as multiverses and polycosmoi go.  I will limit myself to clearing up popular confusions about Peirce’s concept of abductive inference.

Analytic philosophy swayed many people into thinking science could be reduced to purely deductive reasoning, eliminating induction and ignoring abduction, but Peirce was a practicing scientist who worked outside that warp.  In his model of the inquiry process abduction is at root logically prior to any discussion of probabilities, however true it may be that all three modes of inference work in tandem to advance any moderately complex investigation.

The following article has more information on the history and function of abductive inference.

• Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy

See especially the following sections.

• Types of Reasoning in C.S. Peirce
• Aristotle’s “Apagogy” • Abductive Reasoning as Problem Reduction

cc: Peirce List (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Re: Peter Woit • Beyond Experiment

The phrase “inference to the best explanation” was coined by Gilbert Harman in his attempt to explain abductive inference but it conveys the wrong impression to anyone who takes it as a substitute for the whole course of inquiry rather than just its starting point.  Peirce himself was always very clear about this.

Bayes’ theorem is a deductive identity which adds no information to the observed data, nor is that its job.  It adds no rows or columns to the matrix of contingencies nor makes the observations populating its cells.  Those are jobs for the independent capacities of abductive and inductive reasoning.

Resources

• Inquiry
• Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy
• Prospects for Inquiry Driven Systems
• Introduction to Inquiry Driven Systems
• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry

cc: Peirce List (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Re: Peter Woit • Beyond Experiment

There is a lot of misunderstanding about the requirement of falsifiability.  At root it is simply the idea that an empirical law is not a logical tautology.  I don’t see any reason to dispense with that just yet.  In practice the principle affords us leverage only when we have two or more theories competing to describe the same domain.

Another thing that needs to be understood is that no reasoning from Bayes’ theorem nor any inference from probabilities has anything to do with the initial abduction, which takes us from a state of unquantifiable uncertainty to the first hypothesis of a conceptual framework, model category, or reference class.  It is only after those choices are made that speaking of probabilities becomes possible.

Resources

• Inquiry
• Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy
• Prospects for Inquiry Driven Systems
• Introduction to Inquiry Driven Systems
• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry

cc: Peirce List (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)