Category Archives: Proof Theory

¿Shifting Paradigms? • 1

Posted on August 6, 2014 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Dana Scott • Shifting Paradigms? 2014 Jul 28 This is very interesting to me, but not all my posts make it to the list, so I will spend a few days reflecting on it and post a comment on … Continue reading →

Posted in Foundations of Mathematics, Inquiry, Logic, Mathematics, Model Theory, Paradigms, Peirce, Programming, Proof Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

How To Succeed In Proof Business Without Really Trying

Posted on July 15, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: R.J. Lipton • Surely You Are Joking? Comment 1 Even at the mailroom entry point of propositional calculus, there is a qualitative difference between insight proofs and routine proofs.  Human beings can do either sort, as a rule, but … Continue reading →

Posted in Algorithms, Animata, Artificial Intelligence, Automatic Theorem Proving, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Computational Complexity, Graph Theory, Logic, Logical Graphs, Minimal Negation Operators, Model Theory, Peirce, Praeclarum Theorema, Proof Theory, Propositional Calculus, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments

What Is A Theorem That A Human May Prove It?

Posted on June 19, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Gil Kalai • Why Is Mathematics Possible? • Tim Gowers’ Take On The Matter Comment 1 To the extent that mathematics has to do with reasoning about possible existence, or inference from pure hypothesis, a line of thinking going … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Conjecture, Deduction, Epistemology, Hypothesis, Induction, Inquiry, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Peirce, Proof Theory, Retroduction, Theorem Proving, Warren S. McCulloch | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Propositions As Types Analogy • 1

Posted on January 29, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: R.J. Lipton • Mathematical Tricks One of my favorite mathematical tricks — it almost seems too tricky to be true — is the Propositions As Types Analogy. And I see hints the 2‑part analogy can be extended to a … Continue reading →

Posted in Animata, C.S. Peirce, Combinator Calculus, Combinatory Logic, Curry–Howard Isomorphism, Graph Theory, Lambda Calculus, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Proof Theory, Propositions As Types Analogy, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Peirce’s Law

Posted on October 6, 2008 by Jon Awbrey

Peirce’s law is a logical proposition that states a non-obvious truth of classical logic and affords a novel way of defining classical propositional calculus. Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Equational Inference, Laws of Form, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Peirce's Law, Proof Theory, Propositional Calculus, Propositions As Types Analogy, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 15 Comments

Praeclarum Theorema

Posted on October 5, 2008 by Jon Awbrey

The praeclarum theorema, or splendid theorem, is a theorem of propositional calculus that was noted and named by G.W. Leibniz. Continue reading →

Posted in Abstraction, Animata, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Deduction, Equational Inference, Form, Graph Theory, Laws of Form, Leibniz, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Model Theory, Painted Cacti, Peirce, Praeclarum Theorema, Proof Theory, Propositional Calculus, Propositional Equation Reasoning Systems, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 17 Comments