Category Archives: Inquiry

Another aspect of a sign’s complete meaning concerns the reference a sign has to its interpretants, which interpretants are collectively known as the connotation of the sign.  In the pragmatic theory of sign relations, connotative references fall within the projection … Continue reading →

One aspect of a sign’s complete meaning concerns the reference a sign has to its objects, which objects are collectively known as the denotation of the sign.  In the pragmatic theory of sign relations, denotative references fall within the projection … Continue reading →

For an arbitrary triadic relation whether it happens to be a sign relation or not, there are six dyadic relations obtained by projecting on one of the planes of the -space   The six dyadic projections of a triadic relation … Continue reading →

Soon after I made my third foray into grad school, this time in Systems Engineering, I was trying to explain sign relations to my advisor and he — being the very model of a modern systems engineer — asked me … Continue reading →

There is a close relationship between the pragmatic theory of signs and the pragmatic theory of inquiry.  In fact, the correspondence between the two studies exhibits so many congruences and parallels it is often best to treat them as integral … Continue reading →

One of Peirce’s clearest and most complete definitions of a sign is one he gives in the context of providing a definition for logic, and so it is informative to view it in that setting. Logic will here be defined … Continue reading →

Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive … Continue reading →

C.S. Peirce defines logic as “formal semiotic”, using formal to highlight the place of logic as a normative science, over and above the descriptive study of signs and their role in wider fields of play.  Understanding logic as Peirce understands … Continue reading →