Replies to Comments on the Peirce List
Re: Gary Fuhrman
The following two passages may help to clarify Peirce’s admittedly peculiar usage of “formal” in this context.
Re: Jim Willgoose
We discussed that passage on Objective Logic a little while back, until we reached the customary fork of diverging interpretations. The relation between classical logic and its supposed alternatives is a current interest of mine, but I can see no alternative except to view it from the classical side. This may be due to the way that modalities — from impossible to possible and contingent to necessary — are viewed by the Platonic realist mathematician. What is possible is real and thus realized in the requisite space of possibility. Then the possible may be surveyed, at any rate, at the end of inquiry, with regard to the way its real extension may be found arrayed under its comprehension. Of course you see the catch — “at the end of inquiry” — and there the rub must be left to its itch, for now.
But I cited that passage this time around only for the sake of collating its introduction, “Logic, in the sense of Normative Semeotic”, with the words of Peirce’s definition, “Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic”, giving us reason to say that Peirce equates formal with normative in this frame.