Information = Comprehension × Extension • Selection 1

Our first text comes from Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1866, titled “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”.  I still remember the first time I read these words and the light that lit up the page and my mind.

Let us now return to the information.  The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous comprehension.  That is to say that the proper office of the comprehension is to determine the extension of the term.  For instance, you and I are men because we possess those attributes — having two legs, being rational, &c. — which make up the comprehension of man.  Every addition to the comprehension of a term lessens its extension up to a certain point, after that further additions increase the information instead.

Thus, let us commence with the term colour;  add to the comprehension of this term, that of redRed colour has considerably less extension than colour;  add to this the comprehension of darkdark red colour has still less [extension].  Add to this the comprehension of non‑bluenon‑blue dark red colour has the same extension as dark red colour, so that the non‑blue here performs a work of supererogation;  it tells us that no dark red colour is blue, but does none of the proper business of connotation, that of diminishing the extension at all.  Thus information measures the superfluous comprehension.  And, hence, whenever we make a symbol to express any thing or any attribute we cannot make it so empty that it shall have no superfluous comprehension.

I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that the puzzle of the validity of scientific inference lies merely in this superfluous comprehension and is therefore entirely removed by a consideration of the laws of information.

(Peirce 1866, p. 467)

Reference

  • Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”, Lowell Lectures of 1866, pp. 357–504 in Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866, Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

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Information = Comprehension × Extension • Preamble

Eight summers ago I hit on what struck me as a new insight into one of the most recalcitrant problems in Peirce’s semiotics and logic of science, namely, the relation between “the manner in which different representations stand for their objects” and the way in which different inferences transform states of information.  I roughed out a sketch of my epiphany in a series of blog posts then set it aside for the cool of later reflection.  Now looks to be a choice moment for taking another look.

A first pass through the variations of representation and reasoning detects the axes of iconic, indexical, and symbolic manners of representation on the one hand and the axes of abductive, inductive, and deductive modes of inference on the other.  Early and often Peirce suggests a natural correspondence between the main modes of inference and the main manners of representation but his early arguments differ from his later accounts in ways deserving close examination, partly for the extra points in his line of reasoning and partly for his explanation of indices as signs constituted by convening the variant conceptions of sundry interpreters.

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Pragmatic Cosmos • 1

Re: Michael HarrisNot About Fibonacci

I have often reflected on the interminglings of the main three normative sciences.  In one of my earliest meditations I saw Beauty, Goodness, and Truth as the intersecting circles of a Venn diagram, with the summum bonum the central cell.

As far as our ability to approach our object from our origin without, perfect knowledge of the Good would require us to know all the consequences of our contemplated actions while perfect knowledge of the True would require us to know all the axiom sets which never beget a contradiction.

As far as I could tell, and as far as I could see deciding with the empirical tests and theorem provers I could morally and mathematically envision devising, the above two tasks exceed the talents of mortal humans and all their technological extensions.

But when it comes to Beauty, our form of being appears to have an inborn sense to guide us on our quest to the highest good.  That way through beauty to our ultimate goal I called the human‑hearted path.

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Logical Graphs • Discussion 11

Re: Logical Graphs • Formal Development
Re: Laws of FormLyle Anderson

LA:
What does it mean to assign a label or name to a node of the Logical Graph?

In LoF, the variables of the algebra represent unknown expressions of the arithmetic.  There are two tokens in the expressions for Logical Graphs, the node and the edge.  You assign different symbols to the naked node of the outside and the node representing the inside, since the edge between them represents the boundary of a distinction.  When you put a letter “a” next to the naked node, what does that mean?  If “a” represents another Logical Graph of uncertain arrangement, then how is it attached to the naked node?

Dear Lyle,

By now we’ve seen quite a few ways to represent Peirce’s logical graphs and Spencer Brown’s formal arrangements in various styles of formal languages and concrete media.  A fairly detailed discussion of how to translate among the more common representations we’ve been using, along with those I found useful in computing logical graphs, was given in the post linked below and serialized in the fourteen posts which follow it.

As a general consideration, we need to remember one of the first lessons we learned in geometry, and never confuse the drawing, the representation, with the mathematical object it represents.  Despite their name, “graphs” in the sense of mathematical graph theory are mathematical objects, not to be found on the page, screen, or in the state of any concrete system, whether cognitive or computational.  The same goes for Spencer Brown’s formal arrangements.  Among other things, that is one of the reasons Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics is so critical to understanding logical graphs, laws of form, and logic in general.

Regards.

Jon

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Logical Graphs • Discussion 10

Re: Logical Graphs • Formal Development
Re: Laws of FormArmahedi Mahzar

AM:
GSB took J1 : (a(a)) =   as the first algebraic primitive and the second one is transposition so he only need only 2 primitives for the primary algebra.

Reflexion ((a)) = a is proven without using Cancellation (( )) =   .

In fact, he can prove cancellation from C1 reflexion.

Condensation ( )( ) = ( ) can be derived from C4 iteration.

So, his algebra is simpler from your Cactus Calculus.

Dear Arma,

I had a feeling we’ve discussed this before, and probably in a lot more detail than I have time for at the moment, so I hunted up the previous discussion — turns out it was on the old Yahoo Group — there’s a copy of that below for whatever memory‑jogging it may be worth.

To my way of thinking, what you say about reducing the primary arithmetic to the primary algebra shows a lack of appreciation for the fundamental nature of that distinction.  Indeed, the recognition and clarification of that distinction is one of the most important upgrades Spencer Brown added to Peirce’s initial systems of logical graphs.

As far as the other score goes, the advantages of handling label changes and structure changes separately in one’s syntactic operations is just one of those things I learned in the hard knocks way of programming theorem provers for logical graphs, and I all I can do is keep recommending it on that account.

Regards,

Jon

From: Jon Awbrey
To:   Yahoo Laws Of Form
Date: 8/15/2017, 2:10 PM
Re:   Peirce's Law

Arma, All ...

Re: https://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Logical_graph#Axioms

Let me try a few ascii graphics to see how this site treats them.

It's clear that the two systems are equivalent, since we have:

 a   a
 o---o
 |
 @
 =======J1′ [delete]
 o---o
 |
 @
 =======I2  [cancel]
 @
 =======QED J1

For my part, I am less concerned with small differences in the lengths
of proofs than I am with other factors.  It's hard for me to remember
all the reasons for decisions I made 40 years ago — as a general rule,
Peirce's way of looking at the relation between mathematics and logic
was and still is very influential and the other main impact came from
the nuts @ and bolts | requirements of computational representation.

But looking at the choice with present eyes, I think I would continue
to prefer the I1, I2, J1′, J2 system over the alternative simply for
the fact that it treats two different types of operation separately,
namely, changes in formal or graphical structure versus changes in
the occurrence or placement of variables.

Regards,

Jon

On 8/14/2017 11:01 PM, armahedi@yahoo.com [lawsofform] wrote:
> Hi Jon
>
> With your answer
>     'Recall that I am using “p(p)=( )” for my J1.
>      I can go back to calling it J1′ if need be.',
> I realize that your axiom system is different from 
> Brownian Primary Algebra.
>
> Here is your axioms
> I1   ()()=()
> I2   (())=
> J1'  (a)a=( )
> J2   ((ab)(ac))=a((b)c)
> and these are Spencer-Brown axioms
> J1   ((a)a)=
> J2   ((ab)(ac))=a((b)(c))
>
> From these axioms you derived three theorems which are 
> identical to the first Spencer-Brown Primary Algebra 
> consequences: Reflection, Generation and Integration.
>
> Here are your proofs in parentheses notation with 
> my critical observations.
>
> You prove Reflection ((a))=a in 8 steps
> ((a))
> =((a))((                 ))           I2
> =((a))((     (a))(     a)))        J1'
> =     ((((a))(a))(((a))a)))      J2
> =     ((        )(((a))a)))         J1'
> =     ((( a ) a )(((a))a)))       J1'
> =    a((( a )   )(((a)) )))        J2
> =    a((                 ))            J1'
> =    a                                  I2
> while in Brownian Primary Algebra the proof is only 6 steps
> because I2+J1'=J1'+I2=J1
>
> You proved Generation (a)b=(ab)b in 5 steps
> (a)b
> =(((a)b))          C1
> =(((a)b))((   ))   I2
> =(((a)b))((b)b)) J1'
> =((a))((b)))b      J2
> =(ab)b               C1
> while in Brownian Primary Algebra the proof is only 4 steps
> because I2+J1'=J1.
>
> You proved Integration a( )=( ) in 2 steps
> a( )
> =a(a)            C2
> =( )               J1'
> While in Brownian Primary Algebra the proof is 3 steps
> because it needs another step C1
> a( )
> =a(a)            C2
> =((a(a)))        C1
> =( )                J1
>
> Comparing the proofs it seems to me that Brownian proof is better 
> because it does not need the arithmetical primitives I1 and I2.
>
> The beauty is that the arithmetical primitives become derived 
> theorems in Brownian Primary Algebra. I2 is J1 with x=   dan 
> I1 is the 4th consequence xx=x with x=( ). So Brownian Primary 
> algebra is more economic than your algebra.
>
> However, it is just my subjective aesthetical preference, your 
> logical superstructure (cactus calculus, differential logic and 
> dynamical logic) is still intact fortunately.
>
> Please correct me if I am wrong.
> Thanks
> Arma

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Logical Graphs • Formal Development 8

Exemplary Proofs

Using no more than the axioms and theorems recorded so far, it is possible to prove a multitude of much more complex theorems.  A number of all‑time favorites are linked below.

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Logical Graphs • Formal Development 7

Frequently Used Theorems (concl.)

C3.  Dominant Form Theorem

The third of the frequently used theorems of service to this survey is one Spencer Brown annotates as Consequence 3 (C3) or Integration.  A better mnemonic might be dominance and recession theorem (DART), but perhaps the brevity of dominant form theorem (DFT) is sufficient reminder of its double‑edged role in proofs.

Dominant Form Theorem

Here is a proof of the Dominant Form Theorem.

Dominant Form Theorem • Proof

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Logical Graphs • Formal Development 6

Frequently Used Theorems (cont.)

C2.  Generation Theorem

One theorem of frequent use goes under the nickname of the weed and seed theorem (WAST).  The proof is just an exercise in mathematical induction, once a suitable basis is laid down, and it will be left as an exercise for the reader.  What the WAST says is that a label can be freely distributed or freely erased anywhere in a subtree whose root is labeled with that label.

The second in our list of frequently used theorems is in fact the base case of the weed and seed theorem.  In Laws of Form it goes by the names of Consequence 2 (C2) or Generation.

Generation Theorem

Here is a proof of the Generation Theorem.

Generation Theorem • Proof

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Logical Graphs • Formal Development 5

Frequently Used Theorems

To familiarize ourselves with equational proofs in logical graphs let’s run though the proofs of a few basic theorems in the primary algebra.

C1.  Double Negation Theorem

The first theorem goes under the names of Consequence 1 (C1), the double negation theorem (DNT), or Reflection.

Double Negation Theorem

The proof that follows is adapted from the one George Spencer Brown gave in his book Laws of Form and credited to two of his students, John Dawes and D.A. Utting.

Double Negation Theorem • Proof

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Logical Graphs • Formal Development 4

Equational Inference

All the initials I_1, I_2, J_1, J_2 have the form of equations.  This means the inference steps they license are reversible.  The proof annotation scheme employed below makes use of double bars =\!=\!=\!=\!=\!= to mark this fact, though it will often be left to the reader to decide which of the two possible directions is the one required for applying the indicated axiom.

The actual business of proof is a far more strategic affair than the routine cranking of inference rules might suggest.  Part of the reason for this lies in the circumstance that the customary types of inference rules combine the moving forward of a state of inquiry with the losing of information along the way that doesn’t appear immediately relevant, at least, not as viewed in the local focus and short run of the proof in question.  Over the long haul, this has the pernicious side‑effect that one is forever strategically required to reconstruct much of the information one had strategically thought to forget at earlier stages of proof, where “before the proof started” can be counted as an earlier stage of the proof in view.

This is just one of the reasons it can be very instructive to study equational inference rules of the sort our axioms have just provided.  Although equational forms of reasoning are paramount in mathematics, they are less familiar to the student of the usual logic textbooks, who may find a few surprises here.

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