Frankl, My Dear • 1

Re: Dick Lipton and Ken Regan(1)(2)

I need to think a little about the context Lipton and Regan have wrapped around the Frankl Conjecture, if not exactly about the problem itself.  This will be a scratch-worky post-in-progress (PIP❢), or a series of posts, and I may even delete it down the road if it runs out of gas or turns into too much nonsense.

Just to get started, let me post the passage from the 2nd of the above articles where I thought I spied something familiar, though it was late, past my bedtime, and I was pondering weak and weary, etc.

Let us use {J_{i}(f)} to denote those {x} such that

\displaystyle f(x) \neq f(x^{i}).

Obviously the following is true:

\displaystyle \frac{|J_{i}(f)|}{2^{n}} = I_{i}(f).

There must be a better notation than {J_{i}} — we are open to suggestions.  Any?

In order to understand the above formulas, we have to back up a little and pick up a couple of earlier definitions, rephrasing them slightly in the style of notation to which I would like you to become accustomed.

Let {\mathbb{B} = \{0,1\}} and let {f : \mathbb{B}^{n} \to \mathbb{B}} be a boolean function.  The influence of the {i}^\text{th} input of {f} is defined by

\displaystyle I_{i}(f) = \mathrm{Prob}_{x}[ f(x) \neq f(x^{i}) ],

where {x^{i}} is equal to

\displaystyle x_{1}, \dots, x_{i-1}, \neg x_{i}, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_{n}.

There is another way of expressing the bit flip operation {x \mapsto x^i} I like a bit better.  Here is the formal definition, using {j} instead of {i} as the index of the indicated variable.

Definition.  Let the function {\lnot_j : \mathbb{B}^k \to \mathbb{B}} be defined for each integer {j} in the interval {[1, k]} by the following equation:

{\lnot_j (x_1, \ldots, x_j, \ldots, x_k) ~=~ x_1 \land \ldots \land x_{j-1} \land \lnot x_j \land x_{j+1} \land \ldots \land x_k}.

It is conventional to write logical conjunction as multiplication, with or without a dot between conjuncts.  It is also convenient in many contexts to write logical negation {\lnot x_j} with a tilde as {\tilde{x}_j} or with distinctive parentheses as {\texttt{(} x_j \texttt{)}}.  Thus we may see the function {\lnot_j : \mathbb{B}^k \to \mathbb{B}} written in either of the following forms:

\begin{matrix}  \lnot_j (x_1, \ldots, x_j, \ldots, x_k)  & = &  x_1 x_2 \ldots x_{j-1} \tilde{x}_j x_{j+1} \ldots x_{k-1} x_k  \\[4pt]  & = &  x_1 x_2 \ldots x_{j-1} \texttt{(} x_j \texttt{)} x_{j+1} \ldots x_{k-1} x_k  \end{matrix}

Visually speaking, {\lnot_j (x_1, \ldots, x_k)} is a singular proposition which picks out a single cell {x} of the associated venn diagram, namely, the cell where {x_j} is false and all the rest of the {x_i} are true.  In other work, I used the above notations for {\lnot_j} in defining minimal negation operators, which may eventually find use in this discussion.

This looks like a good place to break and start a second post in the series.

To be continued …

Posted in Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, Computational Complexity, Differential Logic, Frankl Conjecture, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Péter Frankl | Tagged , , , , , , , , | 11 Comments

Skiourosemiosis • 1

The resultant metaphysical problem now is this:
Does the man go round the squirrel or not?

— William James • Pragmatism

Differential Analysis of Propositions and Transformations

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Differential Logic, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Logic, Peirce, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Skiourosemiosis, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

C.S. Peirce • Syllabus • Selection 1

Selection from C.S. Peirce, “A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic” (1903)

An Outline Classification of the Sciences

180.   This classification, which aims to base itself on the principal affinities of the objects classified, is concerned not with all possible sciences, nor with so many branches of knowledge, but with sciences in their present condition, as so many businesses of groups of living men.  It borrows its idea from Comte’s classification;  namely, the idea that one science depends upon another for fundamental principles, but does not furnish such principles to that other.  It turns out that in most cases the divisions are trichotomic;  the First of the three members relating to universal elements or laws, the Second arranging classes of forms and seeking to bring them under universal laws, the Third going into the utmost detail, describing individual phenomena and endeavoring to explain them.  But not all the divisions are of this character.

The classification has been carried into great detail;  but only its broader divisions are here given.

181.   All science is either,

  • A.  Science of Discovery;
  • B.  Science of Review;  or
  • C.  Practical Science.

182.   By “science of review” is meant the business of those who occupy themselves with arranging the results of discovery, beginning with digests, and going on to endeavor to form a philosophy of science.  Such is the nature of Humboldt’s Cosmos, of Comte’s Philosophie positive, and of Spencer’s Synthetic Philosophy.  The classification of the sciences belongs to this department.

183.   Science of Discovery is either,

  • I.  Mathematics;
  • II.  Philosophy;  or
  • III.  Idioscopy.

184.   Mathematics studies what is and what is not logically possible, without making itself responsible for its actual existence.  Philosophy is positive science, in the sense of discovering what really is true;  but it limits itself to so much of truth as can be inferred from common experience.  Idioscopy embraces all of the special sciences, which are principally occupied with the accumulation of new facts.

185.   Mathematics may be divided into

  • a.  the Mathematics of Logic;
  • b.  the Mathematics of Discrete Series;
  • c.  the Mathematics of Continua and Pseudo-continua.

I shall not carry this division further.  Branch b has recourse to branch a, and branch c to branch b.

186.   Philosophy is divided into

  • a.  Phenomenology;
  • b.  Normative Science;
  • c.  Metaphysics.

Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally present in the phenomenon;  meaning by the phenomenon, whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way.

Normative science distinguishes what ought to be from what ought not to be, and makes many other divisions and arrangements subservient to its primary dualistic distinction.

Metaphysics seeks to give an account of the universe of mind and matter.

Normative science rests largely on phenomenology and on mathematics;  metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative science.

(Peirce, CP 1.180–186, EP 2.258–259, Online)

Notes

Collected Papers 1

  • Pp. 5–9 of A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic, 1903, Alfred Mudge & Son, Boston, bearing the following preface:  “This syllabus has for its object to supplement a course of eight lectures to be delivered at the Lowell Institute, by some statements for which there will not be time in the lectures, and by some others not easily carried away from one hearing.  It is to be a help to those who wish seriously to study the subject, and to show others what the style of thought is that is required in such study.  Like the lectures themselves, this syllabus is intended chiefly to convey results that have never appeared in print;  and much is omitted because it can be found elsewhere.”

Essential Peirce 2(a)(b)

References

  • Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1–6, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), vols. 7–8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935, 1958. Volume 1 : Principles of Philosophy, 1931.
  • Peirce Edition Project (eds., 1998), The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893–1913), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN.
Posted in C.S. Peirce, Classification, Foundations of Mathematics, Logic, Mathematics, Metaphysics, Normative Science, Peirce, Phenomenology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Science, References, Science, Sources | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 12 Comments

¿Shifting Paradigms? • 4

Re: Foundational Crisis?Harvey Friedman

2014 Aug 22

Shock and surprise are relative to a prior state of belief.  The belief that mathematics reduces to logic, and that of a purely deductive sort from given axioms, seems to be a fairly recent notion and never universally shared.  All of which brings us back to the question of locating mathematical inquiry in relation to inquiry in general.

Jon Awbrey

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Foundations of Mathematics, Inquiry, Logic, Mathematics, Model Theory, Paradigms, Peirce, Programming, Proof Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

¿Shifting Paradigms? • 3

Re: What Is Good Mathematics?Harvey Friedman

2014 Aug 17

Speaking of mathematics in the context of “general intellectual activity” brings to mind Raymond Wilder’s take on “mathematics as a cultural system”.

I would like to keep that in mind, if on a back burner, and focus on a more directed species of intellectual activity that goes under the name of inquiry, the flower of which species we know as scientific method, however much method or madcap various lights may see in it.  Whatever the case, that brings us to the task of placing mathematical inquiry within the sphere of inquiry in general.

Here I can do no better than recommend C.S. Peirce’s theory of inquiry as one of the best tacks we can take for approaching this task.

Jon Awbrey

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Foundations of Mathematics, Inquiry, Logic, Mathematics, Model Theory, Paradigms, Peirce, Programming, Proof Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Forest Primeval → Riffs & Rotes

Re: Shifting Paradigms?(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)

Prompted by the discussion of Catalan numbers on the Foundations Of Math List, I dug up a few pieces of early correspondence and later discussions bearing on the correspondences between graph theory and number theory which have occupied me these many years and I began putting reformatted transcripts at the following sites.

Posted in Algebra, Animata, Arithmetic, C.S. Peirce, Catalan Numbers, Combinatorics, Forest Primeval, Foundations of Mathematics, Gödel Numbers, Graph Theory, Group Theory, H.W. Gould, Integer Sequences, Logic, Martin Gardner, Mathematics, Neil Sloane, Number Theory, Paradigmata, Planted Plane Trees, Riffs and Rotes | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

¿Shifting Paradigms? • 2

Re: Timothy Chow • Shifting Paradigms?

2014 Jul 31

I can’t remember when I first started playing with Gödel codings of graph-theoretic structures, which arose in logical and computational settings, but I remember being egged on in that direction by Martin Gardner’s 1976 column on Catalan numbers, planted plane trees, polygon dissections, etc.  Codings being injections from a combinatorial species S to integers, either non-negatives \mathbb{N} or positives \mathbb{M}, I was especially interested in codings that were also surjective, thereby revealing something about the target domain of arithmetic.

The most interesting bijection I found was one between positive integers \mathbb{M} and finite partial functions from \mathbb{M} to \mathbb{M}.  All of this comes straight out of the primes factorizations.  That type of bijection may remind some people of Dana Scott’s D_\infty.  Corresponding to the positive integers there arose two species of graphical structures, which I dubbed “riffs” and “rotes”.  See these links for more info:

The On-Line Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences (OEIS)

Jon Awbrey

An interesting tangent to the main subject, but one that I had some ready thoughts on.

Posted in Algebra, Arithmetic, Combinatorics, Foundations of Mathematics, Graph Theory, Group Theory, Inquiry, Logic, Mathematics, Model Theory, Number Theory, Paradigms, Peirce, Programming, Proof Theory, Riffs and Rotes | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

¿Shifting Paradigms? • 1

Re: Dana Scott • Shifting Paradigms?

2014 Jul 28

This is very interesting to me, but not all my posts make it to the list, so I will spend a few days reflecting on it and post a comment on my blog, linked below. Thanks for the stimulating question.

Jon Awbrey

I’ve been trying to get back to this for over a week now, but there are times when all you can do is document the process, the flow of thought, no matter how slow it goes. So read my ellipsis … and watch this space  

Posted in Foundations of Mathematics, Inquiry, Logic, Mathematics, Model Theory, Paradigms, Peirce, Programming, Proof Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

☯ Quantum Mechanics ☯

☯ Quantum Mechanics ☯

Posted in Photo, Quantum Mechanics | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Why is there so much falsity in the world?

Because people prefer falsity to truth, illusion to reality.

Being the drift of my reflections on the plays I saw at Stratford this summer —
King Lear, King John, Man of La Mancha, Alice Through the Looking-Glass,
Crazy for You, Hay Fever.

The Beaux’ Stratagem • Masks, Madness, & Sonnets • Antony and Cleopatra

Posted in Drama, Falsity, Illusion, Memoir, Question, Reality, Reflection, Shakespeare, The Big Picture, Theatre, Truth | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , | 9 Comments