Category Archives: Intension

At this point in his inventory of scientific reasoning, Peirce is relating the nature of inference, information, and inquiry to the character of the signs mediating the process in question, a process he is presently describing as symbolization. In the interest … Continue reading →

We have now seen how the mind is forced by the very nature of inference itself to make use of induction and hypothesis. But the question arises how these conclusions come to receive their justification by the event.  Why are … Continue reading →

A similar line of thought may be gone through in reference to hypothesis.  In this case we must start with the consideration of the term: spherical, bright, fragrant, juicy, tropical fruit. Such a term, formed by the sum of the comprehensions … Continue reading →

Accordingly, if we are engaged in symbolizing and we come to such a proposition as “Neat, swine, sheep, and deer are herbivorous”, we know firstly that the disjunctive term may be replaced by a true symbol.  But suppose we know … Continue reading →

Yet there are combinations of words and combinations of conceptions which are not strictly speaking symbols.  These are of two kinds of which I will give you instances.  We have first cases like: man and horse and kangaroo and whale, and … Continue reading →

For this purpose, I must call your attention to the differences there are in the manner in which different representations stand for their objects. In the first place there are likenesses or copies — such as statues, pictures, emblems, hieroglyphics, … Continue reading →

Let us now return to the information.  The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous comprehension.  That is to say that the proper office of the comprehension is to determine the extension of the term.  For instance, … Continue reading →

Another angle from which to approach the incidence of signs and inquiry is by way of Charles S. Peirce’s “laws of information” and the corresponding theory of information he developed from the time of his lectures on the “Logic of Science” at … Continue reading →