Category Archives: Formal Languages

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 16

Posted on June 25, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • JA • JFS JFS: For those of us who are trying to convince modern students to study Peirce, we need to become bilingual.  We need to show how his terminology and notations map to and from … Continue reading →

Posted in Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Chomsky, Complementarity, Dewey, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 15

Posted on June 24, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • JA • GF One could hardly dispute the importance of logical implication relations like   Their set-theoretic analogues are subset relations like which are almost the canonical way of expressing constraint, determination, information, and so on.  … Continue reading →

Posted in Animata, Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Chomsky, Dewey, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 14

Posted on June 24, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • JA • JFS We find ourselves at the thresh‑old of yet another recurring discussion, this time concerning Peirce’s use of the adjectives formal and quasi‑necessary with normative connotations, all of which I think is clear from … Continue reading →

Posted in Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Chomsky, Complementarity, Dewey, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 13

Posted on June 22, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

I would like to return to a point where the paths of discussion began to diverge and then bifurcated so chaotically that I could not track them further, namely, here: Re: Peirce List • JA • GF • JA I … Continue reading →

Posted in Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Chomsky, Complementarity, Dewey, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 12

Posted on June 20, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Kirsti Määttänen I have a sense of what Peirce meant by the “Logic of Science” and what Dewey meant by calling Logic the “Theory of Inquiry”.  If that’s logic in the narrow sense and not Logic … Continue reading →

Posted in Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Complementarity, Dewey, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 11

Posted on June 17, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Kirsti Määttänen • Jon Awbrey • John Sowa The most important difference between linguistics and logic is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative. Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive, but most … Continue reading →

Posted in Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Chomsky, Complementarity, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 10

Posted on June 16, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Jon Alan Schmidt JA: As I am realizing more and more in recent years, analyzing and classifying signs as a substitute for analyzing and classifying objects is the first slip of a slide into nominalism, namely, … Continue reading →

Posted in Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Chomsky, Complementarity, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Signs Of Signs • 4

Posted on May 31, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language But then inevitably I find myself wondering whether a proof assistant, or even a formal system, can make the distinction between “technical” and “fundamental” questions.  There seems to be no logical distinction.  The … Continue reading →

Posted in Aesthetics, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Logic, Mathematics, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Pragmatic Semiotic Information, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Semantics, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Signs Of Signs • 3

Posted on May 27, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language And if we don’t [keep our stories straight], who puts us away? One’s answer, or at least one’s initial response to that question will turn on how one feels about formal realities.  As … Continue reading →

Posted in Aesthetics, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Logic, Mathematics, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Pragmatic Semiotic Information, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Semantics, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Signs Of Signs • 2

Posted on May 27, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language I compared mathematics to a “consensual hallucination,” like virtual reality, and I continue to believe that the aim is to get (consensually) to the point where that hallucination is a second nature. I … Continue reading →

Posted in Aesthetics, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Logic, Mathematics, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Pragmatic Semiotic Information, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Semantics, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment