Folks who were around a dozen years ago will remember all the fun and fuss we had when some rather absurd things about Peirce’s theory of truth or the lack thereof popped up in various Wikipedious articles. Some of us eventually hashed out a fairly useful account of a Pragmatic Theory of Truth, at least, in my humble opinion.
Busy watching Goblet of Fire 🔥 for about the dozenth time now, where I am finding Rita Skeeter’s theory of Alternative Truth especially poignant in view of current events, but I will dig up some old scraps of text later.
I haven’t looked at these articles since the days I wasted trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions, especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence. To make the shortest possible shrift, we need to keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean “triple correspondence”, in other words, just another name for a triadic relation.