Category Archives: Phenomenology

Peirce clearly set great store by his 1902 definition of logic as formal semiotic, whose principles he proposed to deduce by evident and rigorous mathematical reasoning from his triadic relational definition of a sign. It is from this definition, together … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List • Gary Fuhrman (1) (2) The following two passages may help to clarify Peirce’s admittedly peculiar usage of “formal” in this context. C.S. Peirce • Objective Logic C.S. Peirce • Logic as Semiotic Re: Peirce List • … Continue reading →

Walking the line between phenomenology and mathematics, let us cast our eyes on the prize of defining logic.  Peirce defines logic as formal semiotic — and that in turn calls for a definition of sign. Here is a place where … Continue reading →

If I hear what a couple of my interlocutors are saying, we need both a place to stand and direction of focus in order to tackle the massa confusa that rises up like a great cloud of unknowing every time … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List • Rafe Champion (1) (2) Where to begin?  Perhaps in the middle … In the early 90s — having spent a quarter of a century acquiring a bachelor’s in “Mathematical and Philosophical Method”, a master’s in mathematics, … Continue reading →

Recent discussions have brought to mind a number of persistent problems in pragmatic thought, especially if we aim to apply Peirce’s conceptions to real practical effect in understanding pressing real-world phenomena.  Among the host of issues, the following two objectives … Continue reading →

It looks like we might be due for one of our recurring reviews on the closely related subjects of definition and determination, with special reference to what Peirce himself wrote on the topics. Arisbe List Archive Here is a collection … Continue reading →