Re: Pragmatic Truth • (1) • (2)
Re: OEIS Wiki | Correspondence Theory Of Truth
Re: FB | Inquiry Driven Systems • Richard Saunders

RS:

Given that “facts are basically combinations of objects together with their properties or relations;  so the fact that Fido barks is the combination of an object (i.e., Fido) with one of Fido’s properties (that he barks)”, if the object and the property are real, then the correspondence theory of truth seems adequate for most purposes.  But the question remains, what is “real”?  I like Phillip Dick’s suggestion that reality is what remains when you stop believing in it.

Dear Richard,

Let me clear up a few things about that section of the Correspondence Theory article you quote above.  The style of it tells me other Wikipedians probably had a bigger hand in it than I did — for my part I most likely took it as a thumbnail sketch of the conventional view, a sop to the two‑headed dogma of analytic philosoppy, if you will.

Pragmatic treatments of truth begin from a decidedly different standpoint and make a radical departure from correspondence accounts.  But there is nothing new about the pragmatic view, as we can see from the way Kant and even the Ancients had already criticized correspondence theories.

Resources

• Pragmatic Maxim
• Pragmatic Theory Of Truth
• Survey of Inquiry Driven Systems

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