Category Archives: Dewey

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 16

Posted on June 25, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • JA • JFS JFS: For those of us who are trying to convince modern students to study Peirce, we need to become bilingual.  We need to show how his terminology and notations map to and from … Continue reading →

Posted in Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Chomsky, Complementarity, Dewey, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 15

Posted on June 24, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • JA • GF One could hardly dispute the importance of logical implication relations like   Their set-theoretic analogues are subset relations like which are almost the canonical way of expressing constraint, determination, information, and so on.  … Continue reading →

Posted in Animata, Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Chomsky, Dewey, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 14

Posted on June 24, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • JA • JFS We find ourselves at the thresh‑old of yet another recurring discussion, this time concerning Peirce’s use of the adjectives formal and quasi‑necessary with normative connotations, all of which I think is clear from … Continue reading →

Posted in Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Chomsky, Complementarity, Dewey, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 13

Posted on June 22, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

I would like to return to a point where the paths of discussion began to diverge and then bifurcated so chaotically that I could not track them further, namely, here: Re: Peirce List • JA • GF • JA I … Continue reading →

Posted in Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Chomsky, Complementarity, Dewey, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 12

Posted on June 20, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Kirsti Määttänen I have a sense of what Peirce meant by the “Logic of Science” and what Dewey meant by calling Logic the “Theory of Inquiry”.  If that’s logic in the narrow sense and not Logic … Continue reading →

Posted in Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Complementarity, Dewey, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 12

Posted on March 28, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • JFS • JFS • JAS • GF • JAS • GF I realize that iconolatry — just one of many forms of dyadic reductionism — runs too deep at present for most folks to appreciate this, … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 11

Posted on March 28, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • CG • JA • CG • JA • CG • JA • CG One of the points I’ve been trying to make all along is that a person doesn’t normally need to make a working … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 10

Posted on March 27, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

A paragraph from Kant and associated discussion I added to the Wikipedia article on the Correspondence Theory of Truth in June 2006 is useful at this point, and it serves to set up a corresponding statement from Peirce that we’ll take … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 9

Posted on March 26, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Clark Goble • Jon Awbrey • Clark Goble • Jon Awbrey • Clark Goble To put things more plainly, it’s a routine observation we have no need for moods and tenses in actually doing mathematics, that … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 8

Posted on March 25, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Clark Goble • Jon Awbrey • Clark Goble • Jon Awbrey With respect to the issues surrounding “modal realism” — what stance Peirce took and when he took it — let me refer to a figure … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments