The present patch of discussion is concerned with describing a family of formal languages whose typical representative is the painted cactus language Once we have the abstract forms of cactus languages well enough in hand to grasp their application, the next order of business is to interpret them for propositional logic, thus producing a sentential calculus, an order of reasoning which constitutes an active ingredient and a significant component of all logical reasoning.
The standard devices of formal grammars and formal language theory are adequate to describe the language of interest from an external point of view but the ultimate desire is for something more exacting, to turn the tables on the order of description and enter on a process of eversion which evolves to the point of asking: To what extent can the language capture the essential features and laws of its own grammar and describe the active principles of its own generation? In other words: How well can the language be described by using the language itself to do so?
To address the above questions, we have to express what a grammar says about a language in terms of what a language can say on its own. In effect, it is necessary to analyze the kinds of meaningful statements grammars are capable of making about languages in general and to relate them to the kinds of meaningful statements the sentences of the cactus language might be interpreted as making about the same topics. So far in the present discussion, the sentences of the cactus language make no meaningful statements at all, much less any meaningful statements about languages and their constitutions. As of yet, those sentences subsist in the form of purely abstract, formal, and uninterpreted combinatorial constructions.
Resources
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cc: Conceptual Graphs • Cybernetics • Structural Modeling • Systems Science





