Pragmatic Traction • 5

☯  TAO  ☯

Trials And Outcomes

Expression | Impression

Effectors | Receptors

Exertion | Reaction

Conduct | Bearing

Control | Observe

Effect | Detect

Poke | Peek

Note | Note

Pat | Apt | Tap

Just a few notes to be developed later …

Pragmatism makes thinking to consist in the living inferential metaboly of symbols whose purport lies in conditional general resolutions to act.  (Peirce, CP 5.402 n. 3).

Such reasonings and all reasonings turn upon the idea that if one exerts certain kinds of volition, one will undergo in return certain compulsory perceptions.  Now this sort of consideration, namely, that certain lines of conduct will entail certain kinds of inevitable experiences is what is called a “practical consideration”.  Hence is justified the maxim, belief in which constitutes pragmatism;  namely:

In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception;  and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception.  (Peirce, CP 5.9, 1905).

Reference

This entry was posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty, Volition and tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

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