{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 3

Re: Peirce List Discussion • John Sowa

I gave Frederik Stjernfelt’s Natural Propositions a careful reading back when the Peirce List took it up.  Here is an archived topic thread that contains the author’s lead-off plus a sample of ensuing discussion:

I find a few remnants of my own comments and reflections here:

I have in mind getting back to the issues raised by that reading someday but it would take me too far afield from my current focus to do that now.

The short shrift for now is that Peirce is not talking about propositions in the sense of “double signs, informational signs, quasi-propositions, or Dicisigns” at this juncture but rather the simpler sorts of propositions that fall under the heading of the Propositional Calculus as currently understood, adequately and most felicitously dealt with of course by means of Peirce’s own Alpha Graphs.

The concept of information that comes up in this context is rather distinct.  To my way of thinking the earlier notion of information, however roughly cut, is superior in its underlying principles, being more realistic compared to the residual nominalism of the later concept, at least, as interpreted by others.

This entry was posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Extension, Hypothesis, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Information Theory, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Pragmatism, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations and tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

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